title: The Bayesian boom: good thing or bad?
abstract: A series of high-profile critiques of Bayesian models of cognition have recently sparked controversy. These critiques question the contribution of rational, normative considerations in the study of cognition. The present article takes central claims from these critiques and evaluates them in light of specific models. Closer consideration of actual examples of Bayesian treatments of different cognitive phenomena allows one to defuse these critiques showing that they cannot be sustained across the diversity of applications of the Bayesian framework for cognitive modeling. More generally, there is nothing in the Bayesian framework that would inherently give rise to the deficits that these critiques perceive, suggesting they have been framed at the wrong level of generality. At the same time, the examples are used to demonstrate the different ways in which consideration of rationality uniquely benefits both theory and practice in the study of cognition.
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychological Sciences, Centre for Cognition, Computation, and Modelling, Birkbeck, University of London London, UK.
authors.forename: Ulrike
authors.initials: U
authors.lastname: Hahn
keywords: Bayesian modeling; normativity; probability; rationality