title: A philosopher's reflections on the discovery of mirror neurons.
abstract: Mirror neurons fire both when a primate executes a transitive action directed toward a target (e.g., grasping) and when he observes the same action performed by another. According to the prevalent interpretation, action-mirroring is a process of interpersonal neural similarity whereby an observer maps the agent's perceived movements onto her own motor repertoire. Furthermore, ever since Gallese and Goldman's (1998) influential paper, action-mirroring has been linked to third-person mindreading on the grounds that it enables an observer to represent the agent's intention. In this paper, I criticize the prevalent interpretation on two grounds. First, action-mirroring could not result in interpersonal neural similarity unless there was a single mechanism active at different times in a single brain during the execution and the perception of acts of grasping. Second, such a neural mechanism is better conceived as underlying the possession of the concept of grasping than as a basis for mindreading.
authors.affiliation: Institut Jean Nicod, UMR 8129, EHESS/ENS/CNRS, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
authors.forename: Pierre
authors.initials: P
authors.lastname: Jacob
mesh_terms: D000818:Animals; D001921:Brain / Q000502:physiology*; D003071:Cognition / Q000502:physiology*; D018737:Hand Strength / Q000502:physiology; D000882:Haplorhini; D006801:Humans; D033182:Intention; D007398:Interpersonal Relations; D059167:Mirror Neurons / Q000502:physiology*; D008959:Models, Neurological; D009415:Nerve Net / Q000502:physiology*; D010465:Perception / Q000502:physiology; D010684:Philosophy; D012919:Social Behavior
keywords: Action-mirroring; Embodied cognition; Simulation; Third-person mindreading; Tuning-fork model of social cognition; Understanding goal-directed action