title: Biological constraints do not entail cognitive closure.
abstract: From the premise that our biology imposes cognitive constraints on our epistemic activities, a series of prominent authors--most notably Fodor, Chomsky and McGinn--have argued that we are cognitively closed to certain aspects and properties of the world. Cognitive constraints, they argue, entail cognitive closure. I argue that this is not the case. More precisely, I detect two unwarranted conflations at the core of arguments deriving closure from constraints. The first is a conflation of what I will refer to as 'representation' and 'object of representation'. The second confuses the cognitive scope of the assisted mind for that of the unassisted mind. Cognitive closure, I conclude, cannot be established from pointing out the (uncontroversial) existence of cognitive constraints.
authors.affiliation: University of Johannesburg, Department of Philosophy, B603A, PO Box 524, Auckland Park 2006, South Africa. Electronic address: michaelvlerick@gmail.com.
authors.forename: Michael
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Vlerick
mesh_terms: D001695:Biology; D003071:Cognition; D006801:Humans
keywords: Assisted mind; Cognitive closure; Cognitive constraints; Epistemic boundedness; Epistemic scope; Extended mind