title: Why reject a sensory imagery theory of control consciousness?
abstract: Mandik (2010) defends a motor theory of control consciousness according to which nonsensory states, like motor commands, directly contribute to the awareness we have of ourselves as being in control of our actions. Along the way, he argues that his theory is to be preferred over Prinz's (2007) sensory imagery theory, which denies that nonsensory states play any direct role in the generation of control consciousness. I argue that Mandik's criticisms of Prinz's theory fall short, but that nonetheless there are reasons to favor a motor theory of control consciousness over a sensory imagery theory.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy, Graduate Center, CUNY.
authors.forename: Myrto I
authors.initials: MI
authors.lastname: Mylopoulos
mesh_terms: D003243:Consciousness / Q000502:physiology*; D056344:Executive Function / Q000502:physiology*; D006801:Humans; D009043:Motor Activity / Q000502:physiology*; D012677:Sensation / Q000502:physiology*
keywords: Agency; Consciousness; Forward model; Imagery; Motor control; Phenomenology; Sense of control