title: Philosophy for the rest of cognitive science.
abstract: Cognitive science has always included multiple methodologies and theoretical commitments. The philosophy of cognitive science should embrace, or at least acknowledge, this diversity. Bechtel's (2009a) proposed philosophy of cognitive science, however, applies only to representationalist and mechanist cognitive science, ignoring the substantial minority of dynamically oriented cognitive scientists. As an example of nonrepresentational, dynamical cognitive science, we describe strong anticipation as a model for circadian systems (Stepp & Turvey, 2009). We then propose a philosophy of science appropriate to nonrepresentational, dynamical cognitive science.
authors.affiliation: Center for the Ecological Study of Perception and Action, University of Connecticut and Haskins LaboratoriesScientific and Philosophical Studies of Mind Program, Franklin and Marshall College.
authors.forename: Nigel
authors.initials: N
authors.lastname: Stepp
authors.forename: Anthony
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Chemero
authors.forename: Michael T
authors.initials: MT
authors.lastname: Turvey
mesh_terms: D002940:Circadian Rhythm / Q000502:physiology; D003071:Cognition / Q000502:physiology*; D019336:Cognitive Science; D006801:Humans; D008962:Models, Theoretical; D010684:Philosophy
keywords: Dynamical systems; Explanation; Mechanism; Philosophy of science; Representation