title: Singular thought: object-files, person-files, and the sortal PERSON.
abstract: In philosophy, "singular thought" refers to our capacity to represent entities as individuals, rather than as possessors of properties. Philosophers who defend singularism argue that perception allows us to mentally latch onto objects and persons directly, without conceptualizing them as being of a certain sort. Singularists assume that singular thought forms a unified psychological kind, regardless of the nature of the individuals represented. Empirical findings on the special psychological role of persons as opposed to inanimates threaten singularism. They raise the possibility that tracking individuals specifically as persons might require conceptualizing them in certain ways, for example, as persons. In this paper, we take such a possibility seriously but ultimately reject it. Instead, we propose to revise a prominent singularist theory, the theory of mental files, in order to accommodate data on the psychological distinctiveness of persons: We advocate the postulation of perceptual person-files. Perceptual tracking via person-files is different from object-tracking but also from descriptive classification under the sortal concept PERSON.
authors.affiliation: Institut Jean Nicod, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
authors.forename: Michael
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Murez
authors.forename: Joulia
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Smortchkova
mesh_terms: D006801:Humans; D021641:Recognition, Psychology / Q000502:physiology*; D012938:Social Perception; D056345:Theory of Mind / Q000502:physiology; D013850:Thinking / Q000502:physiology*
keywords: Agent-files; Mental files; Object-files; Perceptual tracking; Person-files; Singular thought