title: It's OK if 'my brain made me do it': people's intuitions about free will and neuroscientific prediction.
abstract: In recent years, a number of prominent scientists have argued that free will is an illusion, appealing to evidence demonstrating that information about brain activity can be used to predict behavior before people are aware of having made a decision. These scientists claim that the possibility of perfect prediction based on neural information challenges the ordinary understanding of free will. In this paper we provide evidence suggesting that most people do not view the possibility of neuro-prediction as a threat to free will unless it also raises concerns about manipulation of the agent's behavior. In Experiment 1 two scenarios described future brain imaging technology that allows perfect prediction of decisions and actions based on earlier neural activity, and this possibility did not undermine most people's attributions of free will or responsibility, except in the scenario that also allowed manipulation. In Experiment 2 the scenarios increased the salience of the physicalist implications of neuro-prediction, while in Experiment 3 the scenarios suggested dualism, with perfect prediction by mindreaders. The patterns of results for these two experiments were similar to the results in Experiment 1, suggesting that participants do not understand free will to require specific metaphysical conditions regarding the mind-body relation. Most people seem to understand free will in a way that is not threatened by perfect prediction based on neural information, suggesting that they believe that just because "my brain made me do it," that does not mean that I didn't do it of my own free will.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy, Georgia State University, P.O. Box 3994, Atlanta, GA 30302, United States; Neuroscience Institute, Georgia State University, P.O. Box 5030, Atlanta, GA 30302, United States. Electronic address: enahmias@gsu.edu.
authors.forename: Eddy
authors.initials: E
authors.lastname: Nahmias
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychology, Emory University, 36 Eagle Row, Room 270, Atlanta, GA 30322, United States; Center for Ethics, Emory University, 1531 Dickey Drive, Atlanta, GA 30322, United States.
authors.forename: Jason
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Shepard
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130, United States; Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program, Washington University in St. Louis, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130, United States.
authors.forename: Shane
authors.initials: S
authors.lastname: Reuter
mesh_terms: D001288:Attention; D001921:Brain / Q000502:physiology*; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D019545:Intuition / Q000502:physiology*; D008297:Male; D009488:Neurosciences; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D014836:Volition / Q000502:physiology*; D055815:Young Adult
keywords: Agency; Free will; Neuroscience; Prediction; Responsibility