title: What is the harm in harmful conception? On threshold harms in non-identity cases.
abstract: Has the time come to put to bed the concept of a harm threshold when discussing the ethics of reproductive decision making and the legal limits that should be placed upon it? In this commentary, we defend the claim that there exist good moral reasons, despite the conclusions of the non-identity problem, based on the interests of those we might create, to refrain from bringing to birth individuals whose lives are often described in the philosophical literature as 'less than worth living'.
authors.affiliation: Centre for Social Ethics and Policy, School of Law, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, Lancashire, M13 9PL, UK, nicola.williams-2@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk.
authors.forename: Nicola J
authors.initials: NJ
authors.lastname: Williams
authors.forename: John
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Harris
mesh_terms: D006233:Persons with Disabilities; D006291:Health Policy / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D006801:Humans; D012098:Reproduction / Q000941:ethics*; D012099:Reproductive Techniques / Q000941:ethics* / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D026712:Value of Life; D015974:Wrongful Life / Q000941:ethics*