title: Bundling Health Insurance and Microfinance in India: There Cannot be Adverse Selection if There is No Demand.
authors.affiliation: MIT Department of Economics, 77 Massachusetts Ave., Building E17, Cambridge, MA 02139 ( banerjee@mit.edu ).
authors.forename: Abhijit
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Banerjee
authors.affiliation: MIT Department of Economics, 77 Massachusetts Ave., Building E17, Cambridge, MA 02139 ( eduo@mit.edu ).
authors.forename: Esther
authors.initials: E
authors.lastname: Duflo
authors.affiliation: Department of Economics, Littauer Center 232, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 ( horn-beck@fas.harvard.edu ).
authors.forename: Richard
authors.initials: R
authors.lastname: Hornbeck
mesh_terms: D005382:Financing, Personal; D006801:Humans; D007194:India; D015273:Insurance Selection Bias; D007348:Insurance, Health / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*