title: The nature and value of bioethics expertise.
abstract: In this article, I address the extent to which experts in bioethics can contribute to healthcare delivery by way of aid in clinical decision-making and policy-formation. I argue that experts in bioethics are moral experts, in that their substantive moral views are more likely to be correct than those of non-bioethicists, all else being equal, but that such expertise is of use in a relatively limited class of cases. In so doing, I respond to two recent arguments against the view that bioethicists are moral experts, one by Christopher Cowley and another by David Archard. I further argue that bioethics experts have significant additional contributions to make to healthcare delivery, and highlight a hitherto neglected aspect of that contribution: amelioration of moral misconception among clinicians. I describe in detail several aspects of moral misconception, and show how the bioethicist is in a prime position to resolve that sort of error.
authors.forename: Eric
authors.initials: E
authors.lastname: Vogelstein
mesh_terms: D026688:Bioethical Issues; D003657:Decision Making / Q000941:ethics*; D034462:Dissent and Disputes; D026689:Ethical Analysis; D028663:Ethical Theory; D026822:Ethicists / Q000592:standards; D006801:Humans; D028662:Principle-Based Ethics; D024382:Professional Role
keywords: clinical ethics; common-sense morality; ethical decision-making; ethicist; moral disagreement; moral expertise; moral misconception