title: Fully device-independent quantum key distribution.
abstract: Quantum cryptography promises levels of security that are impossible to replicate in a classical world. Can this security be guaranteed even when the quantum devices on which the protocol relies are untrusted? This central question dates back to the early 1990s when the challenge of achieving device-independent quantum key distribution was first formulated. We answer this challenge by rigorously proving the device-independent security of a slight variant of Ekert's original entanglement-based protocol against the most general (coherent) attacks. The resulting protocol is robust: While assuming only that the devices can be modeled by the laws of quantum mechanics and are spatially isolated from each other and from any adversary's laboratory, it achieves a linear key rate and tolerates a constant noise rate in the devices. In particular, the devices may have quantum memory and share arbitrary quantum correlations with the eavesdropper. The proof of security is based on a new quantitative understanding of the monogamous nature of quantum correlations in the context of a multiparty protocol.
authors.affiliation: University of California, Berkeley, California 94720, USA.
authors.forename: Umesh
authors.initials: U
authors.lastname: Vazirani
authors.affiliation: California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California 91125, USA.
authors.forename: Thomas
authors.initials: T
authors.lastname: Vidick