title: Naive Probability: Model-Based Estimates of Unique Events.
abstract: We describe a dual-process theory of how individuals estimate the probabilities of unique events, such as Hillary Clinton becoming U.S. President. It postulates that uncertainty is a guide to improbability. In its computer implementation, an intuitive system 1 simulates evidence in mental models and forms analog non-numerical representations of the magnitude of degrees of belief. This system has minimal computational power and combines evidence using a small repertoire of primitive operations. It resolves the uncertainty of divergent evidence for single events, for conjunctions of events, and for inclusive disjunctions of events, by taking a primitive average of non-numerical probabilities. It computes conditional probabilities in a tractable way, treating the given event as evidence that may be relevant to the probability of the dependent event. A deliberative system 2 maps the resulting representations into numerical probabilities. With access to working memory, it carries out arithmetical operations in combining numerical estimates. Experiments corroborated the theory's predictions. Participants concurred in estimates of real possibilities. They violated the complete joint probability distribution in the predicted ways, when they made estimates about conjunctions: P(A), P(B), P(A and B), disjunctions: P(A), P(B), P(A or B or both), and conditional probabilities P(A), P(B), P(B|A). They were faster to estimate the probabilities of compound propositions when they had already estimated the probabilities of each of their components. We discuss the implications of these results for theories of probabilistic reasoning.
authors.affiliation: Navy Center for Applied Research in Artificial Intelligence, Naval Research Laboratory.
authors.forename: Sangeet S
authors.initials: SS
authors.lastname: Khemlani
authors.affiliation: Center for Cognitive Science, University of Freiburg.
authors.forename: Max
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Lotstein
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychology, Princeton University.|Department of Psychology, New York University.
authors.forename: Philip N
authors.initials: PN
authors.lastname: Johnson-Laird
mesh_terms: D001499:Bayes Theorem; D006801:Humans; D007600:Judgment / Q000502:physiology*; D008962:Models, Theoretical; D011336:Probability; D035501:Uncertainty
keywords: Bayesianism; Frequentism; Mental models; Subjective probabilities