title: Optimal cooperation-trap strategies for the iterated rock-paper-scissors game.
abstract: In an iterated non-cooperative game, if all the players act to maximize their individual accumulated payoff, the system as a whole usually converges to a Nash equilibrium that poorly benefits any player. Here we show that such an undesirable destiny is avoidable in an iterated Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game involving two rational players, X and Y. Player X has the option of proactively adopting a cooperation-trap strategy, which enforces complete cooperation from the rational player Y and leads to a highly beneficial and maximally fair situation to both players. That maximal degree of cooperation is achievable in such a competitive system with cyclic dominance of actions may stimulate further theoretical and empirical studies on how to resolve conflicts and enhance cooperation in human societies.
authors.affiliation: State Key Laboratory of Theoretical Physics, Institute of Theoretical Physics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China.
authors.forename: Zedong
authors.initials: Z
authors.lastname: Bi
authors.affiliation: State Key Laboratory of Theoretical Physics, Institute of Theoretical Physics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China.
authors.forename: Hai-Jun
authors.initials: HJ
authors.lastname: Zhou
mesh_terms: D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D006801:Humans; D008960:Models, Psychological; D010988:Play and Playthings / Q000523:psychology*