Evolutionary dynamics of the traveler's dilemma and minimum-effort coordination games on complex networks.
The traveler's dilemma game and the minimum-effort coordination game are social dilemmas that have received significant attention resulting from the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are inconsistent with the results found when the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, both the traveler's dilemma and the minimum-effort coordination games have potentially important applications in evolutionary biology. Interestingly, standard deterministic evolutionary game theory, as represented by the replicator dynamics in a well-mixed population, is also inadequate to account for the behavior observed in these games. Here we study the evolutionary dynamics of both these games in populations with interaction patterns described by a variety of complex network topologies. We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of these games through agent-based simulations on both model and empirical networks. In particular, we study the effects of network clustering and assortativity on the evolutionary dynamics of both games. In general, we show that the evolutionary behavior of the traveler's dilemma and minimum-effort coordination games on complex networks is in good agreement with that observed experimentally. Thus, formulating the traveler's dilemma and the minimum-effort coordination games on complex networks neatly resolves the paradoxical aspects of these games.
Department of Physics, University of Massachusetts, Boston, Massachusetts 02125-3393, USA.
Swami
S
Iyer
Department of Mathematics, University of Massachusetts, Boston, Massachusetts 02125-3393, USA.
Timothy
T
Killingback
D016000:Cluster Analysis; D003198:Computer Simulation; D005716:Game Theory; D012919:Social Behavior; D013269:Stochastic Processes