Effect of a national primary care pay for performance scheme on emergency hospital admissions for ambulatory care sensitive conditions: controlled longitudinal study.
OBJECTIVE
To estimate the impact of a national primary care pay for performance scheme, the Quality and Outcomes Framework in England, on emergency hospital admissions for ambulatory care sensitive conditions (ACSCs).


METHODS
Controlled longitudinal study.


METHODS
English National Health Service between 1998/99 and 2010/11.


METHODS
Populations registered with each of 6975 family practices in England.


METHODS
Year specific differences between trend adjusted emergency hospital admission rates for incentivised ACSCs before and after the introduction of the Quality and Outcomes Framework scheme and two comparators: non-incentivised ACSCs and non-ACSCs.


RESULTS
Incentivised ACSC admissions showed a relative reduction of 2.7% (95% confidence interval 1.6% to 3.8%) in the first year of the Quality and Outcomes Framework compared with ACSCs that were not incentivised. This increased to a relative reduction of 8.0% (6.9% to 9.1%) in 2010/11. Compared with conditions that are not regarded as being influenced by the quality of ambulatory care (non-ACSCs), incentivised ACSCs also showed a relative reduction in rates of emergency admissions of 2.8% (2.0% to 3.6%) in the first year increasing to 10.9% (10.1% to 11.7%) by 2010/11.


CONCLUSIONS
The introduction of a major national pay for performance scheme for primary care in England was associated with a decrease in emergency admissions for incentivised conditions compared with conditions that were not incentivised. Contemporaneous health service changes seem unlikely to have caused the sharp change in the trajectory of incentivised ACSC admissions immediately after the introduction of the Quality and Outcomes Framework. The decrease seems larger than would be expected from the changes in the process measures that were incentivised, suggesting that the pay for performance scheme may have had impacts on quality of care beyond the directly incentivised activities.
Manchester Centre for Health Economics, Institute of Population Health, University of Manchester, UK Faculty of Pharmaceutical Sciences, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada Centre for Health Evaluation and Outcome Sciences, St Paul's Hospital, Vancouver, BC, Canada.
Mark J
MJ
Harrison
Centre for Health Economics, University of York, York, UK Institute for Health Economics and Management, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland.
Mark
M
Dusheiko
Manchester Centre for Health Economics, Institute of Population Health, University of Manchester, UK.
Matt
M
Sutton
Faculty of Pharmaceutical Sciences, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada.
Hugh
H
Gravelle
Faculty of Pharmaceutical Sciences, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada.
Tim
T
Doran
Cambridge Centre for Health Services Research, University of Cambridge, Forvie Site, Robinson Way, Cambridge, CB2 0SR, UK mr108@cam.ac.uk.
Martin
M
Roland
D000553:Ambulatory Care / Q000191:economics*; D004739:England; D006760:Hospitalization / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*; D008137:Longitudinal Studies; D017063:Outcome Assessment, Health Care / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D011320:Primary Health Care / Q000191:economics*; D011787:Quality of Health Care / Q000191:economics; D012052:Reimbursement, Incentive / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*