title: 'Utilitarian' judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas do not reflect impartial concern for the greater good.
abstract: A growing body of research has focused on so-called 'utilitarian' judgments in moral dilemmas in which participants have to choose whether to sacrifice one person in order to save the lives of a greater number. However, the relation between such 'utilitarian' judgments and genuine utilitarian impartial concern for the greater good remains unclear. Across four studies, we investigated the relationship between 'utilitarian' judgment in such sacrificial dilemmas and a range of traits, attitudes, judgments and behaviors that either reflect or reject an impartial concern for the greater good of all. In Study 1, we found that rates of 'utilitarian' judgment were associated with a broadly immoral outlook concerning clear ethical transgressions in a business context, as well as with sub-clinical psychopathy. In Study 2, we found that 'utilitarian' judgment was associated with greater endorsement of rational egoism, less donation of money to a charity, and less identification with the whole of humanity, a core feature of classical utilitarianism. In Studies 3 and 4, we found no association between 'utilitarian' judgments in sacrificial dilemmas and characteristic utilitarian judgments relating to assistance to distant people in need, self-sacrifice and impartiality, even when the utilitarian justification for these judgments was made explicit and unequivocal. This lack of association remained even when we controlled for the antisocial element in 'utilitarian' judgment. Taken together, these results suggest that there is very little relation between sacrificial judgments in the hypothetical dilemmas that dominate current research, and a genuine utilitarian approach to ethics.
authors.affiliation: Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Littlegate House, St. Ebbe's St., Oxford OX1 1PT, UK; Oxford Centre for Neuroethics, University of Oxford, Littlegate House, St. Ebbe's Street, Oxford OX1 1PT, UK.
authors.forename: Guy
authors.initials: G
authors.lastname: Kahane
authors.affiliation: Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Littlegate House, St. Ebbe's St., Oxford OX1 1PT, UK; Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, South Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3UD, UK.
authors.forename: Jim A C
authors.initials: JA
authors.lastname: Everett
authors.affiliation: Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Littlegate House, St. Ebbe's St., Oxford OX1 1PT, UK.
authors.forename: Brian D
authors.initials: BD
authors.lastname: Earp
authors.affiliation: Centre for Research in Psychology, Behaviour & Achievement, Coventry University, Priory Street, Coventry CV1 5FB, UK.
authors.forename: Miguel
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Farias
authors.affiliation: Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Littlegate House, St. Ebbe's St., Oxford OX1 1PT, UK; Oxford Centre for Neuroethics, University of Oxford, Littlegate House, St. Ebbe's Street, Oxford OX1 1PT, UK.
authors.forename: Julian
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Savulescu
mesh_terms: D000328:Adult; D000533:Altruism; D028663:Ethical Theory; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D007600:Judgment; D008297:Male; D009014:Morals
keywords: Altruism; Impartiality; Moral dilemmas; Moral judgment; Psychopathy; Utilitarianism