title: On Direct Social Perception.
abstract: Direct Social Perception (DSP) is the idea that we can non-inferentially perceive others' mental states. In this paper, I argue that the standard way of framing DSP leaves the debate at an impasse. I suggest two alternative interpretations of the idea that we see others' mental states: others' mental states are represented in the content of our perception, and we have basic perceptual beliefs about others' mental states. I argue that the latter interpretation of DSP is more promising and examine the kinds of mental states that plausibly could satisfy this version of DSP.
authors.affiliation: Oklahoma State University, 246 Murray Hall, Stillwater, OK 74078, United States. Electronic address: Shannon.spaulding@okstate.edu.
authors.forename: Shannon
authors.initials: S
authors.lastname: Spaulding
mesh_terms: D006801:Humans; D012938:Social Perception; D056345:Theory of Mind / Q000502:physiology*; D013850:Thinking / Q000502:physiology*
keywords: Content of perception; Inference; Perception; Social cognition; Theory of mind