Incentivizing biodiversity conservation in artisanal fishing communities through territorial user rights and business model innovation.
Territorial user rights for fisheries are being promoted to enhance the sustainability of small-scale fisheries. Using Chile as a case study, we designed a market-based program aimed at improving fishers' livelihoods while incentivizing the establishment and enforcement of no-take areas within areas managed with territorial user right regimes. Building on explicit enabling conditions (i.e., high levels of governance, participation, and empowerment), we used a place-based, human-centered approach to design a program that will have the necessary support and buy-in from local fishers to result in landscape-scale biodiversity benefits. Transactional infrastructure must be complex enough to capture the biodiversity benefits being created, but simple enough so that the program can be scaled up and is attractive to potential financiers. Biodiversity benefits created must be commoditized, and desired behavioral changes must be verified within a transactional context. Demand must be generated for fisher-created biodiversity benefits in order to attract financing and to scale the market model. Important design decisions around these 3 components-supply, transactional infrastructure, and demand-must be made based on local social-ecological conditions. Our market model, which is being piloted in Chile, is a flexible foundation on which to base scalable opportunities to operationalize a scheme that incentivizes local, verifiable biodiversity benefits via conservation behaviors by fishers that could likely result in significant marine conservation gains and novel cross-sector alliances.
Departamento de Ecologia, Center of Applied Ecology and Sustainability (CAPES) and Centro de Conservacion Marina, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile, Alameda 340, Santiago, Chile.|Advanced Conservation Strategies (ACS), Midway, 84049, UT, U.S.A.
Stefan
S
Gelcich
Advanced Conservation Strategies (ACS), Midway, 84049, UT, U.S.A.|Department of Ecology & Evolutionary Biology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 14853, U.S.A.
C Josh
CJ
Donlan
D000818:Animals; D044822:Biodiversity; D002677:Chile; D003247:Conservation of Natural Resources / Q000191:economics / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence / Q000379:methods*; D058735:Environmental Policy / Q000191:economics; D005398:Fisheries / Q000191:economics / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence / Q000379:methods*; D005399:Fishes; D007448:Invertebrates; D009042:Motivation
Chile; compensaciones; conservación marina; diseño antropocéntrico; human-centered design; marine conservation; marine protected areas; market solutions; offsets; pesquerias de pequeña escala; small-scale fishers; soluciones de mercado; áreas marinas protegidas