title: Can computational goals inform theories of vision?
abstract: One of the most lasting contributions of Marr's posthumous book is his articulation of the different "levels of analysis" that are needed to understand vision. Although a variety of work has examined how these different levels are related, there is comparatively little examination of the assumptions on which his proposed levels rest, or the plausibility of the approach Marr articulated given those assumptions. Marr placed particular significance on computational level theory, which specifies the "goal" of a computation, its appropriateness for solving a particular problem, and the logic by which it can be carried out. The structure of computational level theory is inherently teleological: What the brain does is described in terms of its purpose. I argue that computational level theory, and the reverse-engineering approach it inspires, requires understanding the historical trajectory that gave rise to functional capacities that can be meaningfully attributed with some sense of purpose or goal, that is, a reconstruction of the fitness function on which natural selection acted in shaping our visual abilities. I argue that this reconstruction is required to distinguish abilities shaped by natural selection-"natural tasks" -from evolutionary "by-products" (spandrels, co-optations, and exaptations), rather than merely demonstrating that computational goals can be embedded in a Bayesian model that renders a particular behavior or process rational.
authors.affiliation: School of Psychology, University of Sydney.
authors.forename: Barton L
authors.initials: BL
authors.lastname: Anderson
mesh_terms: D005075:Biological Evolution; D006040:Goals; D006801:Humans; D008962:Models, Theoretical; D011582:Psychological Theory; D014785:Vision, Ocular / Q000502:physiology*
keywords: Bayesian modeling; Computational theory; Natural tasks; Teleology