title: Algorithmic mechanisms for reliable crowdsourcing computation under collusion.
abstract: We consider a computing system where a master processor assigns a task for execution to worker processors that may collude. We model the workers' decision of whether to comply (compute the task) or not (return a bogus result to save the computation cost) as a game among workers. That is, we assume that workers are rational in a game-theoretic sense. We identify analytically the parameter conditions for a unique Nash Equilibrium where the master obtains the correct result. We also evaluate experimentally mixed equilibria aiming to attain better reliability-profit trade-offs. For a wide range of parameter values that may be used in practice, our simulations show that, in fact, both master and workers are better off using a pure equilibrium where no worker cheats, even under collusion, and even for colluding behaviors that involve deviating from the game.
authors: IMDEA Networks Institute, Madrid, Spain.
authors: Antonio
authors: A
authors: Fernández Anta
authors: Dept. of Computer Science, University of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus.
authors: Chryssis
authors: C
authors: Georgiou
authors: Dept. of Computer Science, Kean University, Union, New Jersey, United States of America.
authors: Miguel A
authors: MA
authors: Mosteiro
authors: Dept. of Computer Science, Kean University, Union, New Jersey, United States of America.
authors: Daniel
authors: D
authors: Pareja
mesh_terms: D000465:Algorithms; D003198:Computer Simulation; D003205:Computing Methodologies; D063045:Crowdsourcing; D003657:Decision Making; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans