title: Moral repugnance, moral distress, and organ sales.
abstract: Many still oppose legalizing markets in human organs on the grounds that they are morally repugnant. I will argue in this paper that the repugnance felt by some persons towards sales of human organs is insufficient to justify their prohibition. Yet this rejection of the view that markets in human organs should be prohibited because some persons find them to be morally repugnant does not imply that persons' feelings of distress at the possibility of organ sales are irrational. Eduardo Rivera-Lopez argues that such instinctive distress is an appropriate response to the (rationally defensible) perception that certain kinds of arguments that are offered in favor of legalizing organ sales are "in an important sense, illegitimate." Having argued that repugnance should not ground the prohibition of markets in human organs, I will also argue that the moral distress that some feel towards certain arguments that favor such markets is not rationally defensible, either.
authors.affiliation: The College of New Jersey, Ewing Township, New Jersey, USA jtaylor@tcnj.edu.
authors.forename: James Stacey
authors.initials: JS
authors.lastname: Taylor
mesh_terms: D003132:Commerce / Q000941:ethics*; D018864:Cultural Diversity; D006801:Humans; D019520:Living Donors; D009014:Morals; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D013997:Time Factors; D009927:Tissue and Organ Procurement / Q000191:economics* / Q000941:ethics*
keywords: Leon Kass; kidneys; markets; moral distress; organ sales; repugnance