Utility-free heuristic models of two-option choice can mimic predictions of utility-stage models under many conditions.
Economists often model choices as if decision-makers assign each option a scalar value variable, known as utility, and then select the option with the highest utility. It remains unclear whether as-if utility models describe real mental and neural steps in choice. Although choices alone cannot prove the existence of a utility stage, utility transformations are often taken to provide the most parsimonious or psychologically plausible explanation for choice data. Here, we show that it is possible to mathematically transform a large set of common utility-stage two-option choice models (specifically ones in which dimensions are can be decomposed into additive functions) into a heuristic model (specifically, a dimensional prioritization heuristic) that has no utility computation stage. We then show that under a range of plausible assumptions, both classes of model predict similar neural responses. These results highlight the difficulties in using neuroeconomic data to infer the existence of a value stage in choice.
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Rochester Rochester, NY, USA.
Steven T
ST
Piantadosi
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Rochester Rochester, NY, USA ; Center for Visual Science, University of Rochester Rochester, NY, USA.
Benjamin Y
BY
Hayden
decision making; dimensional prioritization; heuristics; utility; value comparison; value correlate