title: Network reciprocity created in prisoner's dilemma games by coupling two mechanisms.
abstract: We found that a nontrivial enhancement of network reciprocity for 2 × 2 prisoner's dilemma games can be achieved by coupling two mechanisms. The first mechanism presumes a larger strategy update neighborhood than the conventional first neighborhood on the underlying network. The second is the strategy-shifting rule. At the initial time step, the averaged cooperation extent is assumed to be 0.5. In the case of strategy shifting, an agent adopts a continuous strategy definition during the initial period of a simulation episode (when the global cooperation fraction decreases from its initial value of 0.5; that is, the enduring period). The agent then switches to a discrete strategy definition in the time period afterwards (when the global cooperation fraction begins to increase again; that is, the expanding period). We explored why this particular enhancement comes about, and to summarize, the continuous strategy during the initial period relaxes the conditions for the survival of relatively cooperative clusters, and the large strategy adaptation neighborhood allows those cooperative clusters to expand easily.
authors.affiliation: Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan.
authors.forename: Jun
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Tanimoto
authors.affiliation: Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan.
authors.forename: Nobuyuki
authors.initials: N
authors.lastname: Kishimoto
mesh_terms: D003198:Computer Simulation; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005716:Game Theory; D008960:Models, Psychological; D000068956:Prisoner Dilemma