title: Social exclusion in finite populations.
abstract: Social exclusion, keeping free riders from benefit sharing, plays an important role in sustaining cooperation in our world. Here we propose two different exclusion regimes, namely, peer exclusion and pool exclusion, to investigate the evolution of social exclusion in finite populations. In the peer exclusion regime, each excluder expels all the defectors independently, and thus bears the total cost on his own, while in the pool exclusion regime, excluders spontaneously form an institution to carry out rejection of the free riders, and each excluder shares the cost equally. In a public goods game containing only excluders and defectors, it is found that peer excluders outperform pool excluders if the exclusion costs are small, and the situation is converse once the exclusion costs exceed some critical points, which holds true for all the selection intensities and different update rules. Moreover, excluders can dominate the whole population under a suitable parameters range in the presence of second-order free riders (cooperators), showing that exclusion has prominent advantages over common costly punishment. More importantly, our finding indicates that the group exclusion mechanism helps the cooperative union to survive under unfavorable conditions. Our results may give some insights into better understanding the prevalence of such a strategy in the real world and its significance in sustaining cooperation.
authors.affiliation: Center for Systems and Control, State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China.
authors.forename: Kun
authors.initials: K
authors.lastname: Li
authors.affiliation: School of Mechano-Electronic Engineering, Xidian University, Xi'an 710071, China.
authors.forename: Rui
authors.initials: R
authors.lastname: Cong
authors.affiliation: School of Mechano-Electronic Engineering, Xidian University, Xi'an 710071, China.
authors.forename: Te
authors.initials: T
authors.lastname: Wu
authors.affiliation: Center for Systems and Control, State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China.
authors.forename: Long
authors.initials: L
authors.lastname: Wang
mesh_terms: D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D008960:Models, Psychological; D011678:Punishment; D012919:Social Behavior