title: Partner Choice Drives the Evolution of Cooperation via Indirect Reciprocity.
abstract: Indirect reciprocity potentially provides an important means for generating cooperation based on helping those who help others. However, the use of 'image scores' to summarize individuals' past behaviour presents a dilemma: individuals withholding help from those of low image score harm their own reputation, yet giving to defectors erodes cooperation. Explaining how indirect reciprocity could evolve has therefore remained problematic. In all previous treatments of indirect reciprocity, individuals are assigned potential recipients and decide whether to cooperate or defect based on their reputation. A second way of achieving discrimination is through partner choice, which should enable individuals to avoid defectors. Here, I develop a model in which individuals choose to donate to anyone within their group, or to none. Whereas image scoring with random pairing produces cycles of cooperation and defection, with partner choice there is almost maximal cooperation. In contrast to image scoring with random pairing, partner choice results in almost perfect contingency, producing the correlation between giving and receiving required for cooperation. In this way, partner choice facilitates much higher and more stable levels of cooperation through image scoring than previously reported and provides a simple mechanism through which systems of helping those who help others can work.
authors.affiliation: Centre for Behaviour and Evolution, Institute of Neuroscience, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom.
authors.forename: Gilbert
authors.initials: G
authors.lastname: Roberts
mesh_terms: D005075:Biological Evolution; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D006801:Humans; D007398:Interpersonal Relations; D008960:Models, Psychological; D012919:Social Behavior