title: The role of explanatory considerations in updating.
abstract: There is an ongoing controversy in philosophy about the connection between explanation and inference. According to Bayesians, explanatory considerations should be given weight in determining which inferences to make, if at all, only insofar as doing so is compatible with Strict Conditionalization. Explanationists, on the other hand, hold that explanatory considerations can be relevant to the question of how much confidence to invest in our hypotheses in ways which violate Strict Conditionalization. The controversy has focused on normative issues. This paper investigates experimentally the descriptive question of whether judgments of the explanatory goodness of hypotheses do play a role when people revise their degrees of belief in those hypotheses upon the receipt of new evidence. We present the results of three experiments that together strongly support the predictive superiority of the explanationist position.
authors.affiliation: Sciences, Normes, Décision, Paris-Sorbonne University, France. Electronic address: igor.douven@paris-sorbonne.fr.
authors.forename: Igor
authors.initials: I
authors.lastname: Douven
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy, University of Utah, United States. Electronic address: jonah.n.schupbach@utah.edu.
authors.forename: Jonah N
authors.initials: JN
authors.lastname: Schupbach
mesh_terms: D000328:Adult; D001499:Bayes Theorem; D003071:Cognition; D032882:Comprehension; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D007600:Judgment; D008297:Male; D008960:Models, Psychological; D011336:Probability; D055815:Young Adult
keywords: Bayesianism; Explanation; Inference; Probability; Updating