title: Experimental philosophy of actual and counterfactual free will intuitions.
abstract: Five experiments suggested that everyday free will and moral responsibility judgments about some hypothetical thought examples differed from free will and moral responsibility judgments about the actual world. Experiment 1 (N=106) showed that free will intuitions about the actual world measured by the FAD-Plus poorly predicted free will intuitions about a hypothetical person performing a determined action (r=.13). Experiments 2-5 replicated this result and found the relations between actual free will judgments and free will judgments about hypothetical determined or fated actions (rs=.22-.35) were much smaller than the differences between them (ηp(2)=.2-.55). These results put some pressure on theoretical accounts of everyday intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility.
authors.affiliation: Michigan Technological University, United States. Electronic address: adfeltz@mtu.edu.
authors.forename: Adam
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Feltz
mesh_terms: D000293:Adolescent; D000328:Adult; D000368:Aged; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D019545:Intuition / Q000502:physiology*; D007600:Judgment; D008297:Male; D008875:Middle Aged; D009014:Morals; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D011582:Psychological Theory; D055815:Young Adult
keywords: Determinism; Fate; Free will; Intuitions; Moral responsibility; Numeracy