title: Ordered Rape: A Principal-Agent Analysis of Wartime Sexual Violence in the DR Congo.
abstract: Policy makers and academics often contend that organizational anarchy permits soldiers to perpetrate sexual violence. A recent United Nations report supports this thesis especially with regard to the massive sexual abuse in the Congolese civil war. We challenge the anarchy argument and maintain, based on a principal-agent framework, that opportunistic military commanders can order their soldiers to rape through the use of sanctions and rewards. Our qualitative and quantitative analysis of a survey of 96 Congolese ex-soldiers shows that ordered rape is more likely in organizations where soldiers fear punishment and in which commanders distribute drugs as stimulants.
authors.affiliation: University of Konstanz, Germany Gerald.Schneider@uni-konstanz.de.
authors.forename: Gerald
authors.initials: G
authors.lastname: Schneider
authors.affiliation: University of Mannheim, Germany.
authors.forename: Lilli
authors.initials: L
authors.lastname: Banholzer
authors.affiliation: University of Konstanz, Germany.
authors.forename: Laura
authors.initials: L
authors.lastname: Albarracin
mesh_terms: D000328:Adult; D002648:Child; D003223:Congo; D015023:Democratic Republic of the Congo; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D008297:Male; D008889:Military Personnel; D009042:Motivation; D011902:Rape; D012742:Sex Offenses; D011795:Surveys and Questionnaires; D014754:Violence; D014857:Warfare
keywords: DR Congo; military hierarchy; principal–agent models; rape; sexual violence