title: Agency and intervention.
abstract: Novel ways to intervene on brain function raise questions about agency and responsibility. Here, I discuss whether direct brain interventions, and in particular, deep brain stimulation, pose a threat to agency in individual cases, or to our general conceptualization of what it is to be a responsible agent. While I do not currently see evidence that these interventions constitute a global challenge to our concept of agency, they do have the potential to diminish agency in individuals. I consider whether the lack of evidence for a global challenge ratifies our folk conceptions, or is a necessary consequence of them. In closing, I propose that our theoretical understanding of agency and our therapeutic approaches could be improved with a more nuanced, multidimensional view of agency.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy, Dartmouth College, Thornton Hall, Hanover, NH 03755, USA adina.roskies@dartmouth.edu.
authors.forename: Adina L
authors.initials: AL
authors.lastname: Roskies
mesh_terms: D001921:Brain / Q000502:physiology*; D046690:Deep Brain Stimulation / Q000009:adverse effects* / Q000379:methods*; D000069280:Electrocorticography; D006801:Humans; D008959:Models, Neurological; D008960:Models, Psychological; D062308:Optogenetics; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D050781:Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation
keywords: agency; deep brain stimulation; ethics; folk psychology; intervention; rationality