title: Social penalty promotes cooperation in a cooperative society.
abstract: Why cooperation is well developed in human society is an unsolved question in biological and human sciences. Vast studies in game theory have revealed that in non-cooperative games selfish behavior generally dominates over cooperation and cooperation can be evolved only under very limited conditions. These studies ask the origin of cooperation; whether cooperation can evolve in a group of selfish individuals. In this paper, instead of asking the origin of cooperation, we consider the enhancement of cooperation in a small already cooperative society. We ask whether cooperative behavior is further promoted in a small cooperative society in which social penalty is devised. We analyze hawk-dove game and prisoner's dilemma introducing social penalty. We then expand it for non-cooperative games in general. The results indicate that cooperation is universally favored if penalty is further imposed. We discuss the current result in terms of the moral, laws, rules and regulations in a society, e.g., criminology and traffic violation.
authors.affiliation: Graduate School of Science and Technology, Shizuoka University, Hamamatsu, 432-8561, Japan.
authors.forename: Hiromu
authors.initials: H
authors.lastname: Ito
authors.affiliation: 1] Graduate School of Science and Technology, Shizuoka University, Hamamatsu, 432-8561, Japan [2] Department of Mathematical and Systems Engineering, Shizuoka University, Hamamatsu, 432-8561, Japan [3] Department of Environmental and Forest Biology, State University of New York College of Environmental Science and Forestry, Syracuse, NY 13210 USA [4] Marine Biosystems Research Center, Chiba University, Uchiura, Kamogawa, Chiba 299-5502, Japan.
authors.forename: Jin
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Yoshimura
mesh_terms: D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D003418:Criminology / Q000379:methods; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D008960:Models, Psychological; D009014:Morals; D011678:Punishment / Q000523:psychology*; D012056:Reinforcement, Social; D012945:Social Values