Introspection.
Two main questions about introspection are addressed: whether it exists, and whether it is a reliable source of self-knowledge. Most philosophers have assumed that the answers to both questions are positive, whereas an increasing number of cognitive scientists take the view that introspection is either nonexistent (with self-attributions of mental states being made on the same sort of interpretative basis as attributions of mental states to other people) or unreliable. A number of different models of self-knowledge are discussed, and the evidence bearing on the existence and reliability of introspection is reviewed. New experiments are required to tease apart some of the alternatives. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.
Department of Philosophy, Skinner Building, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA.
Mark
M
Engelbert
Department of Philosophy, Skinner Building, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA.
Peter
P
Carruthers