title: Stationary Anonymous Sequential Games with Undiscounted Rewards.
abstract: Stationary anonymous sequential games with undiscounted rewards are a special class of games that combine features from both population games (infinitely many players) with stochastic games. We extend the theory for these games to the cases of total expected reward as well as to the expected average reward. We show that in the anonymous sequential game equilibria correspond to the limits of those of related finite population games as the number of players grows to infinity. We provide examples to illustrate our results.
authors: Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Wrocław University of Technology, Wybrzeże Wyspiańskiego 27, 50-370 Wrocław, Poland.
authors: Piotr
authors: P
authors: Więcek
authors: INRIA, 2004 Route des Lucioles, P.B. 93, 06902 Sophia Antipolis Cedex, France.
authors: Eitan
authors: E
authors: Altman
keywords: Anonymous sequential game; Average reward; Population game; Stationary policy; Stochastic game; Total reward