title: Asymmetric Evolutionary Games.
abstract: Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are distinguished by only their strategies. In nature, however, the microscopic interactions between players are nearly always asymmetric due to environmental effects, differing baseline characteristics, and other possible sources of heterogeneity. To model these phenomena, we introduce into evolutionary game theory two broad classes of asymmetric interactions: ecological and genotypic. Ecological asymmetry results from variation in the environments of the players, while genotypic asymmetry is a consequence of the players having differing baseline genotypes. We develop a theory of these forms of asymmetry for games in structured populations and use the classical social dilemmas, the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game, for illustrations. Interestingly, asymmetric games reveal essential differences between models of genetic evolution based on reproduction and models of cultural evolution based on imitation that are not apparent in symmetric games.
authors: Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.
authors: Alex
authors: A
authors: McAvoy
authors: Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.
authors: Christoph
authors: C
authors: Hauert
mesh_terms: D000818:Animals; D005075:Biological Evolution; D019295:Computational Biology / Q000379:methods*; D003468:Cultural Evolution; D004463:Ecology; D005716:Game Theory; D005838:Genotype; D006801:Humans; D008962:Models, Theoretical