Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma.
Within the class of memory-one strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we characterize partner strategies, competitive strategies and zero-determinant strategies. If a player uses a partner strategy, both players can fairly share the social optimum; but a co-player preferring an unfair solution will be penalized by obtaining a reduced payoff. A player using a competitive strategy never obtains less than the co-player. A player using a zero-determinant strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between the two players' payoffs. These properties hold for every strategy used by the co-player, whether memory-one or not.
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, United States.
Christian
C
Hilbe
Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max-Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, 24306 Plön, Germany.
Arne
A
Traulsen
Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, Nordbergstrasse 15, 1090 Vienna, Austria ; International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Schlossplatz 1, 2361 Laxenburg, Austria.
Karl
K
Sigmund
Cooperation; Extortion; Reciprocity; Repeated games; Zero-determinant strategies