X-Phi and Carnapian Explication.
The rise of experimental philosophy (x-phi) has placed metaphilosophical questions, particularly those concerning concepts, at the center of philosophical attention. X-phi offers empirically rigorous methods foridentifyingconceptual content, but what exactly it contributes towardsevaluatingconceptual content remains unclear. We show how x-phi complements Rudolf Carnap's underappreciated methodology for concept determination, explication. This clarifies and extends x-phi's positive philosophical import, and also exhibits explication's broad appeal. But there is a potential problem: Carnap's account of explication was limited to empirical and logical concepts, but many concepts of interest to philosophers (experimental and otherwise) are essentially normative. With formal epistemology as a case study, we show how x-phi assisted explication can apply to normative domains.
Oxford Centre for Neuroethics, University of Oxford, 16-17 St. Ebbes Street, Oxford OX1 1PT, UK.
Joshua
J
Shepherd
Department of Philosophy, Florida State University, 151 Dodd Hall, Tallahassee, FL 32306-1500, USA.
James
J
Justus