title: Procreative Beneficence, Intelligence, and the Optimization Problem.
abstract: According to the Principle of Procreative Beneficence, reproducers should choose the child, of those available to them, expected to have the best life. Savulescu argues reproducers are therefore morally obligated to select for nondisease traits, such as intelligence. Carter and Gordon recently challenged this implication, arguing that Savulescu fails to establish that intelligence promotes well-being. This paper develops two responses. First, I argue that higher intelligence is likely to contribute to well-being on most plausible accounts. Second, I argue that, even if it does not, one can only resist the conclusion that reproducers should select on the basis of intelligence if its expected net effect is neutral. If intelligence reduces expected well-being, then reproducers should select offspring of low intelligence. More likely, the effect of increased intelligence on expected well-being varies at different levels, which makes identifying an optimum for well-being more complex than hitherto appreciated.
authors.affiliation: University of Southampton, Southampton, UK B.M.Saunders@soton.ac.uk.
authors.forename: Ben
authors.initials: B
authors.lastname: Saunders
mesh_terms: D026686:Beneficence; D003657:Decision Making; D006801:Humans; D007360:Intelligence; D028681:Moral Obligations; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D019836:Preimplantation Diagnosis
keywords: Savulescu; genetic selection; intelligence; procreative beneficence; well-being