Solving the puzzle of collective action through inter-individual differences.
Models of collective action infrequently account for differences across individuals beyond a limited set of strategies, ignoring variation in endowment (e.g. physical condition, wealth, knowledge, personality, support), individual costs of effort, or expected gains from cooperation. However, behavioural research indicates these inter-individual differences can have significant effects on the dynamics of collective action. The papers contributed to this theme issue evaluate how individual differences affect the propensity to cooperate, and how they can catalyse others' likelihood of cooperation (e.g. via leadership). Many of the papers emphasize the relationship between individual decisions and socio-ecological context, particularly the effect of group size. All together, the papers in this theme issue provide a more complete picture of collective action, by embracing the reality of inter-individual variation and its multiple roles in the success or failure of collective action.
Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond, Richmond, VA 23173, USA cvonrued@richmond.edu.
Chris
C
von Rueden
Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996, USA Department of Mathematics, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996, USA National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996, USA.
Sergey
S
Gavrilets
Department of Human Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA lukeglowacki@gmail.com.
Luke
L
Glowacki
D000818:Animals; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D003657:Decision Making / Q000502:physiology*; D006801:Humans; D007857:Leadership; D012056:Reinforcement, Social; D012641:Selection, Genetic
collective action; cooperation; inter-individual differences; primates