title: David Hume's no-miracles argument begets a valid No-Miracles Argument.
abstract: Hume's essay 'Of Miracles' has been a focus of controversy ever since its publication. The challenge to Christian orthodoxy was only too evident, but the balance-of-probabilities criterion advanced by Hume for determining when testimony justifies belief in miracles has also been a subject of contention among philosophers. The temptation for those familiar with Bayesian methodology to show that Hume's criterion determines a corresponding balance-of-posterior probabilities in favour of miracles is understandable, but I will argue that their attempts fail. However, I show that his criterion generates a valid form of the so-called No-Miracles Argument appealed to by modern realist philosophers, whose own presentation of it, despite their possession of the probabilistic machinery Hume himself lacked, is invalid.
authors.affiliation: London School of Economics and Political Science, London WC2A 2AE, UK. Electronic address: colin.howson@utoronto.ca.
authors.forename: Colin
authors.initials: C
authors.lastname: Howson
keywords: Bayes's Theorem; Hume; Miracles; No-Miracles Argument; Probability; Testimony