title: The methodological defense of realism scrutinized.
abstract: I revisit an older defense of scientific realism, the methodological defense, a defense developed by both Popper and Feyerabend. The methodological defense of realism concerns the attitude of scientists, not philosophers of science. The methodological defense is as follows: a commitment to realism leads scientists to pursue the truth, which in turn is apt to put them in a better position to get at the truth. In contrast, anti-realists lack the tenacity required to develop a theory to its fullest. As a consequence, they are less likely to get at the truth. My aim is to show that the methodological defense is flawed. I argue that a commitment to realism does not always benefit science, and that there is reason to believe that a research community with both realists and anti-realists in it may be better suited to advancing science. A case study of the Copernican Revolution in astronomy supports this claim.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy, 212 Marano Campus Center, SUNY-Oswego, Oswego, NY, 13126, USA. Electronic address: brad.wray@oswego.edu.
authors.forename: K Brad
authors.initials: KB
authors.lastname: Wray
keywords: Anti-realism; Copernican revolution; Feyerabend; Methodological defense of realism; Popper; Risk spreading