title: A Moorean argument for the full moral status of those with profound intellectual disability.
abstract: This paper is about the moral status of those human beings who have profound intellectual disabilities (PIDs). We hold the common sense view that they have equal status to 'normal' human beings, and a higher status than any non-human animal. On the standard account of moral status, this view cannot be sustained. In this paper, we ask whether, in order to be justified in continuing to hold our view, we are obliged to offer an alternative account that does sustain it? Our answer is that we are not.
authors.affiliation: School of Arts and Humanities, Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham, UK.
authors.forename: Benjamin
authors.initials: B
authors.lastname: Curtis
authors.affiliation: Department of Social Research, University of Helsinki, Finland.
authors.forename: Simo
authors.initials: S
authors.lastname: Vehmas
mesh_terms: D000818:Animals; D034462:Dissent and Disputes; D026689:Ethical Analysis; D006801:Humans; D008607:Intellectual Disability; D028681:Moral Obligations; D028723:Personhood; D026712:Value of Life
keywords: Moral Status