title: Two Monthly Continuous Dynamic Model Based on Nash Bargaining Theory for Conflict Resolution in Reservoir System.
abstract: So far many optimization models based on Nash Bargaining Theory associated with reservoir operation have been developed. Most of them have aimed to provide practical and efficient solutions for water allocation in order to alleviate conflicts among water users. These models can be discussed from two viewpoints: (i) having a discrete nature; and (ii) working on an annual basis. Although discrete dynamic game models provide appropriate reservoir operator policies, their discretization of variables increases the run time and causes dimensionality problems. In this study, two monthly based non-discrete optimization models based on the Nash Bargaining Solution are developed for a reservoir system. In the first model, based on constrained state formulation, the first and second moments (mean and variance) of the state variable (water level in the reservoir) is calculated. Using moment equations as the constraint, the long-term utility of the reservoir manager and water users are optimized. The second model is a dynamic approach structured based on continuous state Markov decision models. The corresponding solution based on the collocation method is structured for a reservoir system. In this model, the reward function is defined based on the Nash Bargaining Solution. Indeed, it is used to yield equilibrium in every proper sub-game, thereby satisfying the Markov perfect equilibrium. Both approaches are applicable for water allocation in arid and semi-arid regions. A case study was carried out at the Zayandeh-Rud river basin located in central Iran to identify the effectiveness of the presented methods. The results are compared with the results of an annual form of dynamic game, a classical stochastic dynamic programming model (e.g. Bayesian Stochastic Dynamic Programming model, BSDP), and a discrete stochastic dynamic game model (PSDNG). By comparing the results of alternative methods, it is shown that both models are capable of tackling conflict issues in water allocation in situations of water scarcity properly. Also, comparing the annual dynamic game models, the presented models result in superior results in practice. Furthermore, unlike discrete dynamic game models, the presented models can significantly reduce the runtime thereby avoiding dimensionality problems.
authors.affiliation: Department of Civil Engineering, Faculty of Engineering Building, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
authors.forename: Mehran
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Homayounfar
authors.affiliation: Department of Civil Engineering, Faculty of Engineering Building, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
authors.forename: Mehdi
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Zomorodian
authors.affiliation: Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural and Biological Engineering, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, United States of America.
authors.forename: Christopher J
authors.initials: CJ
authors.lastname: Martinez
authors.affiliation: Associate Professor, Department of Civil Engineering, Faculty of Engineering Building, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
authors.forename: Sai Hin
authors.initials: SH
authors.lastname: Lai
mesh_terms: D001499:Bayes Theorem; D005716:Game Theory; D007492:Iran; D008962:Models, Theoretical; D017008:Negotiating; D045483:Rivers; D014867:Water
chemical_list: D014867:Water