title: Getting Incentives Right? The Impact of Hospital Capitation Payment in Vietnam.
abstract: This paper evaluates the impact on cost and utilization of a shift from fee-for-service to capitation payment of district hospitals by Vietnam's social health insurance agency. Hospital fixed effects analysis suggests that capitation leads to reduced costs. Hospitals also increased service provision to the uninsured who continue to pay out-of-pocket on a fee-for-service basis. The study points to the need to anticipate unintended effects of payment reforms, especially in the context of a multiple purchaser system. Copyright © The World Bank Health Economics © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
authors.affiliation: Health, Nutrition, and Population Global Practice, The World Bank, Washington, DC, USA.
authors.forename: Ha Thi Hong
authors.initials: HT
authors.lastname: Nguyen
authors.affiliation: Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, Singapore.
authors.forename: Sarah
authors.initials: S
authors.lastname: Bales
authors.affiliation: Development Research Group, The World Bank, Washington, DC, USA.
authors.forename: Adam
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Wagstaff
authors.affiliation: Research and Development Center for Community Health Strategy, Hanoi, Vietnam.
authors.forename: Huyen
authors.initials: H
authors.lastname: Dao
mesh_terms: D002204:Capitation Fee / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*; D018588:Fee-for-Service Plans; D005102:Health Expenditures; D006761:Hospitals / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*; D006801:Humans; D007348:Insurance, Health / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D010816:Physician Incentive Plans / Q000191:economics*; D011795:Surveys and Questionnaires; D014744:Vietnam
keywords: Vietnam; capitation; health insurance; hospitals; provider payment