title: Honesty through repeated interactions.
abstract: In the study of signaling, it is well known that the cost of deception is an essential element for stable honest signaling in nature. In this paper, we show how costs for deception can arise endogenously from repeated interactions between individuals. Utilizing the Sir Philip Sidney game as an illustrative case, we show that repeated interactions can sustain honesty with no observable signal costs, even when deception cannot be directly observed. We provide a number of potential experimental tests for this theory which distinguish it from the available alternatives.
authors: Department of Philosophy, Baker Hall 135, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15217, USA.
authors: Patricia
authors: P
authors: Rich
authors: Department of Philosophy, Baker Hall 135, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15217, USA. Electronic address: kzollman@andrew.cmu.edu.
authors: Kevin J S
authors: KJS
authors: Zollman
mesh_terms: D008954:Models, Biological; D015398:Signal Transduction
keywords: Costly signaling; Handicap theory; Reputation; Sir Philip Sidney game