title: Experimental Philosophy of Explanation Rising: The Case for a Plurality of Concepts of Explanation.
abstract: This paper brings together results from the philosophy and the psychology of explanation to argue that there are multiple concepts of explanation in human psychology. Specifically, it is shown that pluralism about explanation coheres with the multiplicity of models of explanation available in the philosophy of science, and it is supported by evidence from the psychology of explanatory judgment. Focusing on the case of a norm of explanatory power, the paper concludes by responding to the worry that if there is a plurality of concepts of explanation, one will not be able to normatively evaluate what counts as good explanation.
authors: Tilburg Center for Logic, Ethics, and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg University.
authors: Matteo
authors: M
authors: Colombo
mesh_terms: D006801:Humans; D010684:Philosophy; D012586:Science
keywords: Carnapian explication; Experimental philosophy; Explanation; Explanatory power; Pluralism