title: Evolutionary dynamics of a smoothed war of attrition game.
abstract: In evolutionary game theory the War of Attrition game is intended to model animal contests which are decided by non-aggressive behavior, such as the length of time that a participant will persist in the contest. The classical War of Attrition game assumes that no errors are made in the implementation of an animal׳s strategy. However, it is inevitable in reality that such errors must sometimes occur. Here we introduce an extension of the classical War of Attrition game which includes the effect of errors in the implementation of an individual׳s strategy. This extension of the classical game has the important feature that the payoff is continuous, and as a consequence admits evolutionary behavior that is fundamentally different from that possible in the original game. We study the evolutionary dynamics of this new game in well-mixed populations both analytically using adaptive dynamics and through individual-based simulations, and show that there are a variety of possible outcomes, including simple monomorphic or dimorphic configurations which are evolutionarily stable and cannot occur in the classical War of Attrition game. In addition, we study the evolutionary dynamics of this extended game in a variety of spatially and socially structured populations, as represented by different complex network topologies, and show that similar outcomes can also occur in these situations.
authors.affiliation: Computer Science Department, University of Massachusetts, Boston, MA 02125, USA. Electronic address: swami.iyer@gmail.com.
authors.forename: Swami
authors.initials: S
authors.lastname: Iyer
authors.affiliation: Mathematics Department, University of Massachusetts, Boston, MA 02125, USA. Electronic address: timothy.killingback@umb.edu.
authors.forename: Timothy
authors.initials: T
authors.lastname: Killingback
mesh_terms: D005075:Biological Evolution; D005716:Game Theory; D008954:Models, Biological
keywords: Adaptive dynamics; Continuous strategy games; Evolutionary game theory; Spatial games; War of Attrition