title: Use of Insurance Against a Small Loss as an Incentive Strategy.
abstract: The success of extended warranties and buyer protection plans suggests that insurance against a small loss has high decision utility. We explore whether the behavioral insight that people are highly averse to small chances of loss can be used to create a powerful incentive that has very low expected value. We compare decisions of individuals offered fixed payments for healthy choices to those offered insurance in exchange for healthy choices. We test the prediction that aversion to small losses will result in very high rates of health behavior uptake in exchange for insurance. Three hundred participants endowed with a $2 bonus randomly received one of two incentives for completing a scheduled health risk assessment: (1) an insurance guarantee against the 1% risk of losing the $2 bonus or (2) a fixed payment at the expected value of the insurance. Relative to the fixed payment condition, participants in the insurance intervention were 70% more likely to meet their health risk assessment appointment (p <0.01). Fixed payments of $2.59 were needed for every $1 spent on insurance to achieve the same behavioral effect. Loss aversion, probability weighting, and the certainty effect may account for this result. Incentive design may benefit from utilizing an insurance paradigm.
authors.affiliation: University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90033; and RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California 90401.
authors.forename: Daniella
authors.initials: D
authors.lastname: Meeker
authors.affiliation: University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90033.
authors.forename: Christin
authors.initials: C
authors.lastname: Thompson
authors.affiliation: University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195.
authors.forename: Greg
authors.initials: G
authors.lastname: Strylewicz
authors.affiliation: University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90033.
authors.forename: Tara K
authors.initials: TK
authors.lastname: Knight
authors.affiliation: University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90033.
authors.forename: Jason N
authors.initials: JN
authors.lastname: Doctor
keywords: behavioral economics; decision analysis; decision psychology; incentives; insurance; nonexpected utility