title: Mandate-based health reform and the labor market: Evidence from the Massachusetts reform.
abstract: We model the labor market impact of the key provisions of the national and Massachusetts "mandate-based" health reforms: individual mandates, employer mandates, and subsidies. We characterize the compensating differential for employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI) and the welfare impact of reform in terms of "sufficient statistics." We compare welfare under mandate-based reform to welfare in a counterfactual world where individuals do not value ESHI. Relying on the Massachusetts reform, we find that jobs with ESHI pay $2812 less annually, somewhat less than the cost of ESHI to employers. Accordingly, the deadweight loss of mandate-based health reform was approximately 8 percent of its potential size.
authors.affiliation: Haas School, University of California, Berkeley, United States; NBER, United States.
authors.forename: Jonathan T
authors.initials: JT
authors.lastname: Kolstad
authors.affiliation: Department of Economics, Yale University, United States; NBER, United States. Electronic address: amanda.kowalski@yale.edu.
authors.forename: Amanda E
authors.initials: AE
authors.lastname: Kowalski
mesh_terms: D000328:Adult; D004651:Employment; D005260:Female; D018166:Health Care Reform / Q000191:economics; D006801:Humans; D008137:Longitudinal Studies; D008297:Male; D037141:Mandatory Programs / Q000191:economics; D008404:Massachusetts; D058991:Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act / Q000191:economics* / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D011795:Surveys and Questionnaires
keywords: Affordable Care Act; Individual mandate; Labor market; Massachusetts health reform; Welfare effects