Intuitive decision making as a gradual process: investigating semantic intuition-based and priming-based decisions with fMRI.
Intuition has been defined as the instantaneous, experience-based impression of coherence elicited by cues in the environment. In a context of discovery, intuitive decision-making processes can be conceptualized as occurring within two stages, the first of which comprises an implicit perception of coherence that is not (yet) verbalizable. Through a process of spreading activation, this initially non-conscious perception gradually crosses over a threshold of awareness and thereby becomes explicable. Because of its experiential basis, intuition shares conceptual similarities with implicit memory processes. Based on these, the study addresses two research questions: (1) Is the gradual nature of intuitive processes reflected on a neural level? (2) Do intuition-based decisions differ neurally from priming-based decisions?



To answer these questions, we conducted an fMRI study using the triads task and presented participants with coherent word triads that converge on a common fourth concept, and incoherent word triads that do not converge on a common fourth concept. Participants had to perform semantic coherence judgments as well as to indicate whether they immediately knew the fourth concept. To enable investigating intuition-based and priming-based decisions within the same task and with the same participants, we implemented a conceptual priming procedure into the coherence judgment task. We realized this by priming participants with concepts associated with incoherent triads in separate priming blocks prior to the coherence judgments.



For intuition-based decisions, imaging results mainly revealed activity within the orbitofrontal cortex, within the inferior frontal gyrus and the middle temporal gyrus. Activity suppression in the right temporo-occipital complex was observed for priming-based decisions.



With respect to research question 1, our data support a continuity model of intuition because the two intuitive stages show quantitatively distinct brain activation patterns. Regarding research question 2, we can draw the preliminary conclusion of a qualitative difference between intuition-based and priming-based decisions.
Werner Reichardt Centre for Integrative Neuroscience University of Tübingen Tübingen Germany; International Max Planck Research School Tübingen Germany; Department of Psychology University of Basel Switzerland.
Thea
T
Zander
Werner Reichardt Centre for Integrative Neuroscience University of Tübingen Tübingen Germany; Research Centre for Computational Neuroscience and Cognitive Robotics University of Birmingham Birmingham UK.
Ninja K
NK
Horr
Technische Universität Dresden Dresden Germany.
Annette
A
Bolte
Werner Reichardt Centre for Integrative Neuroscience University of Tübingen Tübingen Germany.
Kirsten G
KG
Volz
D000328:Adult; D001921:Brain / Q000502:physiology*; D003463:Cues; D003657:Decision Making / Q000502:physiology*; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D019545:Intuition / Q000502:physiology*; D008279:Magnetic Resonance Imaging; D008297:Male; D012660:Semantics; D055815:Young Adult
Conceptual priming; intuitive decision making; neural activity suppression; orbitofrontal cortex; two‐stage model of intuition