The value of dignity in and for bioethics: rethinking the terms of the debate.
The discussion of the nature and value of dignity in and for bioethics concerns not only the importance of the concept but also the aims of bioethics itself. Here, I challenge the claim that the concept of dignity is useless by challenging the implicit conception of usefulness involved. I argue that the conception of usefulness that both opponents and proponents of dignity in bioethics adopt is rooted in a narrow understanding of the role of normative theory in practical ethical thinking. I then offer an alternate understanding of the nature and value of dignity. I begin by recognizing that claims that one's dignity has been violated point to an important difference between "respect for autonomy" and "respect for persons." I then suggest three different conceptions of how dignity can be normatively guiding for bioethics, and conclude that, ultimately, understanding dignity as the cornerstone of a reflective perspective that frames moral reflection and deliberation is valuable for doing bioethics well.
Department of Philosophy, Occidental College, 1600 Campus Road, Los Angeles, CA, 90041, USA. cmorrissey@oxy.edu.
Clair
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1248-057X
C
Morrissey
D001675:Bioethics; D006806:Human Rights; D006801:Humans; D009014:Morals; D028723:Personhood
Human dignity; Method in bioethics; Respect for persons