title: Variations in patient response to tiered physician networks.
abstract: Prior studies found that tiered provider networks channel patients to preferred providers in certain contexts. This paper evaluates whether the effects of tiered physician networks vary for different types of patients.
  
  
  
  Cross-sectional analysis of fiscal year 2009 to 2010 administrative enrollment and claims data on nonelderly beneficiaries in Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission health plans.
  
  
  
  Main outcome measures are physician market share among new patients and the percent of physician's patients who switch away. We utilized estimated fixed effects linear regression models that were stratified by patient characteristics.
  
  
  
  Physicians with the worst tier rankings had lower market share among new patients who are older and sicker, or male, representing losses in market share of 10% and 15%, respectively, than other tiered physicians. A poor tier ranking did not affect physician market share of new patients who are female or younger. There was no effect of a physician's tier ranking on the proportion of patients who switch to other doctors among any groups of patients.
  
  
  
  Loyalty to their own physicians is pervasive across groups of patients. Physicians with poor tier rankings lost market share among new patients who are older and sicker, and among new male patients. Together, these findings suggest that tiered network designs have the potential for the greatest impact on value in healthcare over time, as more patients seek new relationships with physicians.
authors.affiliation: Department of Health Policy and Management, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, 677 Huntington Ave, Rm 409, Boston, MA 02115. E-mail: asinaiko@hsph.harvard.edu.
authors.forename: Anna D
authors.initials: AD
authors.lastname: Sinaiko
mesh_terms: D000328:Adult; D000368:Aged; D017047:Cost Sharing; D003430:Cross-Sectional Studies; D016208:Databases, Factual; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D019458:Insurance Coverage / Q000191:economics*; D008297:Male; D008329:Managed Care Programs / Q000191:economics*; D008404:Massachusetts; D008875:Middle Aged; D017063:Outcome Assessment, Health Care; D057240:Patient Preference; D010817:Physician-Patient Relations; D010818:Practice Patterns, Physicians' / Q000191:economics; D012052:Reimbursement, Incentive