title: Consent ain't anything: dissent, access and the conditions for consent.
abstract: I argue against various versions of the 'attitude' view of consent and of the 'action' view of consent: I show that neither an attitude nor an action is either necessary or sufficient for consent. I then put forward a different view of consent based on the idea that, given a legitimate epistemic context, absence of dissent is sufficient for consent: what is crucial is having access to dissent. In the latter part of the paper I illustrate my view of consent by applying it to the case of consenting to being an organ donor.
authors.affiliation: University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark. ezio@sund.ku.dk.
authors.forename: Ezio
authors.identifier: http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5734-6622
authors.initials: E
authors.lastname: Di Nucci
mesh_terms: D034462:Dissent and Disputes; D006801:Humans; D007258:Informed Consent; D009927:Tissue and Organ Procurement
keywords: Access; Consent; Dissent; Organ donation