title: The Measles and Free Riders.
abstract: This article takes up a game-theoretic perspective on California's recently passed bill (SB 277) that closes all nonmedical exemptions for school-mandated vaccination. Such a perspective characterizes parental decisions to vaccinate their children as a collective action problem and reveals the presence of an incentive to free ride-to enjoy the benefits of others' efforts to vaccinate their children without vaccinating one's own. This article defends California's legislation as a reasonable means of overcoming the free rider problem and of ensuring that the burdens of vaccination are shared equally.
authors.forename: Katharine
authors.initials: K
authors.lastname: Browne
mesh_terms: D002140:California; D003657:Decision Making; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D008457:Measles / Q000517:prevention & control*; D009042:Motivation; D010290:Parents; D014611:Vaccination / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*
keywords: SB 277; collective action; free riders; measles; vaccination