title: Why contextual preference reversals maximize expected value.
abstract: Contextual preference reversals occur when a preference for one option over another is reversed by the addition of further options. It has been argued that the occurrence of preference reversals in human behavior shows that people violate the axioms of rational choice and that people are not, therefore, expected value maximizers. In contrast, we demonstrate that if a person is only able to make noisy calculations of expected value and noisy observations of the ordinal relations among option features, then the expected value maximizing choice is influenced by the addition of new options and does give rise to apparent preference reversals. We explore the implications of expected value maximizing choice, conditioned on noisy observations, for a range of contextual preference reversal types-including attraction, compromise, similarity, and phantom effects. These preference reversal types have played a key role in the development of models of human choice. We conclude that experiments demonstrating contextual preference reversals are not evidence for irrationality. They are, however, a consequence of expected value maximization given noisy observations. (PsycINFO Database Record
authors.affiliation: School of Computer Science.
authors.forename: Andrew
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Howes
authors.affiliation: School of Psychological Sciences, University of Manchester.
authors.forename: Paul A
authors.initials: PA
authors.lastname: Warren
authors.affiliation: School of Psychological Sciences, University of Manchester.
authors.forename: George
authors.initials: G
authors.lastname: Farmer
authors.affiliation: School of Psychological Sciences, University of Manchester.
authors.forename: Wael
authors.initials: W
authors.lastname: El-Deredy
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychology.
authors.forename: Richard L
authors.initials: RL
authors.lastname: Lewis
mesh_terms: D002755:Choice Behavior; D003071:Cognition; D003657:Decision Making; D006801:Humans; D008128:Logic; D008960:Models, Psychological; D010465:Perception