title: Distributed Cognition and Distributed Morality: Agency, Artifacts and Systems.
abstract: There are various philosophical approaches and theories describing the intimate relation people have to artifacts. In this paper, I explore the relation between two such theories, namely distributed cognition and distributed morality theory. I point out a number of similarities and differences in these views regarding the ontological status they attribute to artifacts and the larger systems they are part of. Having evaluated and compared these views, I continue by focussing on the way cognitive artifacts are used in moral practice. I specifically conceptualise how such artifacts (a) scaffold and extend moral reasoning and decision-making processes, (b) have a certain moral status which is contingent on their cognitive status, and (c) whether responsibility can be attributed to distributed systems. This paper is primarily written for those interested in the intersection of cognitive and moral theory as it relates to artifacts, but also for those independently interested in philosophical debates in extended and distributed cognition and ethics of (cognitive) technology.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia. richard.heersmink@gmail.com.
authors.forename: Richard
authors.identifier: 0000-0002-0102-0308
authors.initials: R
authors.lastname: Heersmink
mesh_terms: D003071:Cognition / Q000941:ethics*; D003657:Decision Making; D028663:Ethical Theory; D006801:Humans; D009014:Morals
keywords: Distributed moral cognition; Material agency; Moral agency; Moral status of artifacts; Neuroethics; Responsibility; Systems agency