title: Competition and screening with motivated health professionals.
abstract: Two hospitals compete for the exclusive services of health professionals, who are privately informed about their ability and motivation. Hospitals differ in their ownership structure and in the mission they pursue. The non-profit hospital sacrifices some profits to follow its mission but becomes attractive for motivated workers. In equilibrium, when both hospitals are active, the sorting of workers to hospitals is efficient and ability-neutral. Allocative distortions are decreasing in the degree of competition and disappear when hospitals are similar. The non-profit hospital tends to provide a higher amount of care and offer lower salaries than the for-profit one.
authors.affiliation: Department of Economics, University of Bologna, P.zza Scaravilli 2, 40126 Bologna, Italy. Electronic address: francesca.barigozzi@unibo.it.
authors.forename: Francesca
authors.initials: F
authors.lastname: Barigozzi
authors.affiliation: Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Strada Maggiore 45, 40125 Bologna, Italy.
authors.forename: Nadia
authors.initials: N
authors.lastname: Burani
mesh_terms: D004465:Economic Competition; D006269:Health Facilities, Proprietary; D006282:Health Personnel; D006777:Hospitals, Proprietary; D006788:Hospitals, Voluntary; D006801:Humans; D009042:Motivation; D010067:Ownership; D010560:Personnel Selection; D014481:United States
keywords: Bidimensional screening; For-profit vs non-profit hospitals; Intrinsic motivation; Multi-principals; Skills; Wage differential