title: Reductionist perspectives and the notion of information.
abstract: Reductionism is the dominant stance of biology. According to this perspective, biological phenomena have to fit with physical explanations. Some biologists thought that the introduction of the idea of program was a sound way to overcome both physicalism and reductionism. We argue instead that the introduction of information theory into biology did not liberate biology from reductionism. We argue that the adoption of information in biology is an erroneous transposition from a specific mathematical domain to one where it does not belong. Indeed, the mathematical framework of the information theory is too rigid and discrete to fit with biological phenomena. Therefore, information in biology represents an inappropriate metaphor. Then, we make explicit the use of metaphors and the choice of explanation mode. We argue that the choice of explanation is not neutral. Furthermore, the use of metaphors in science becomes dangerous when they take the place of theories and they lose their paradoxical content.
authors.affiliation: Centre Cavaillès, République des Savoirs, CNRS USR 3608, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, France. Electronic address: nicole.perret@ens.fr.
authors.forename: Nicole
authors.initials: N
authors.lastname: Perret
authors.affiliation: Centre Cavaillès, République des Savoirs, CNRS USR 3608, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, France; Department of Integrative Physiology and Pathobiology, Tufts University School of Medicine, Boston, MA, USA. Electronic address: Giuseppe.Longo@ens.fr.
authors.forename: Giuseppe
authors.initials: G
authors.lastname: Longo
mesh_terms: D001695:Biology / Q000379:methods*; D007257:Information Theory
keywords: Complexity; Entropy; Information; Mathematical invariance; Metaphor; Reduction