title: The probabilistic no miracles argument.
abstract: This paper develops a probabilistic reconstruction of the No Miracles Argument (NMA) in the debate between scientific realists and anti-realists. The goal of the paper is to clarify and to sharpen the NMA by means of a probabilistic formalization. In particular, I demonstrate that the persuasive force of the NMA depends on the particular disciplinary context where it is applied, and the stability of theories in that discipline. Assessments and critiques of "the" NMA, without reference to a particular context, are misleading and should be relinquished. This result has repercussions for recent anti-realist arguments, such as the claim that the NMA commits the base rate fallacy (Howson (2000), Magnus and Callender (Philosophy of Science,71:320-338, 2004)). It also helps to explain the persistent disagreement between realists and anti-realists.
authors: Tilburg Center for Logic, Ethics and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS), Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands.
authors: Jan
authors: J
authors: Sprenger
keywords: Base rate fallacy; Bayesian epistemology; No miracles argument; Scientific realism; Stability of scientific theories