title: Eye Movements in Strategic Choice.
abstract: In risky and other multiattribute choices, the process of choosing is well described by random walk or drift diffusion models in which evidence is accumulated over time to threshold. In strategic choices, level-kand cognitive hierarchy models have been offered as accounts of the choice process, in which people simulate the choice processes of their opponents or partners. We recorded the eye movements in 2 × 2 symmetric games including dominance-solvable games like prisoner's dilemma and asymmetric coordination games like stag hunt and hawk-dove. The evidence was most consistent with the accumulation of payoff differences over time: we found longer duration choices with more fixations when payoffs differences were more finely balanced, an emerging bias to gaze more at the payoffs for the action ultimately chosen, and that a simple count of transitions between payoffs-whether or not the comparison is strategically informative-was strongly associated with the final choice. The accumulator models do account for these strategic choice process measures, but the level-kand cognitive hierarchy models do not. © 2015 The Authors.Journal of Behavioral Decision Makingpublished by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
authors: University of Warwick Coventry UK.
authors: Neil
authors: N
authors: Stewart
authors: University of Nottingham Nottingham UK.
authors: Simon
authors: S
authors: Gächter
authors: University College London London UK.
authors: Takao
authors: T
authors: Noguchi
authors: University of Warwick Coventry UK.
authors: Timothy L
authors: 0000-0002-4082-2813
authors: TL
authors: Mullett
keywords: accumulator models; cognitive hierarchy; drift diffusion; experimental games; eye tracking; gaze bias effect; gaze cascade effect; hawk–dove; level‐k; normal‐form games; prisoner's dilemma; process tracing; stag hunt