title: Health care and human rights: against the split duty gambit.
abstract: There are various grounds on which one may wish to distinguish a right to health care from a right to health. In this article, I review some old grounds before introducing some new grounds. But my central task is to argue that separating a right to health care from a right to health has objectionable consequences. I offer two main objections. The domestic objection is that separating the two rights prevents the state from fulfilling its duty to maximise the health it provides each citizen from its fixed health budget. The international objection is that separating a human right to health care fails the moral requirement that, for any given moral human right, the substance to which any two right-holders are entitled be of an equal standard.
authors: Trent Center for Bioethics, Humanities, and History of Medicine, Duke University, DUMC 3040, Durham, NC, 27710, USA. gopal.sreenivasan@duke.edu.
authors: Gopal
authors: G
authors: Sreenivasan
mesh_terms: D003695:Delivery of Health Care; D004992:Ethics, Medical; D017048:Health Care Costs / Q000941:ethics; D006297:Health Services Accessibility; D006806:Human Rights; D006801:Humans; D009014:Morals
keywords: Health; Health care; Human rights; Public goods; Rights