title: Beyond the realism debate: The metaphysics of 'racial' distinctions.
abstract: The current metaphysical race debate is very much focused on the realism question whether races exist. In this paper I argue against the importance of this question. Philosophers, biologists and anthropologists expect that answering this question will tell them something substantive about the metaphysics of racial classifications, and will help them to decide whether it is justified to use racial categories in scientific research and public policy. I argue that there are two reasons why these expectations are not fulfilled. First of all, the realism question about race leads to a very broad philosophical debate about the semantics of general terms and the criteria for real kinds, rather than to a debate about the metaphysics of racial categories specifically. Secondly, there is a type of race realism that is so toothless that it is almost completely uninformative about the metaphysics of race. In response to these worries, I argue that the metaphysical race debate should rather be focused on the question in what way and to what extent 'racial' distinctions can ground the epistemic practices of various scientific disciplines. I spell out what I mean by this, and go on to demonstrate that trying to answer this question leads to a more fruitful metaphysical debate.
authors: KU Leuven, Institute of Philosophy, Centre for Logic and Analytical Philosophy, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium. Electronic address: olivier.lemeire@kuleuven.be.
authors: Olivier
authors: O
authors: Lemeire
mesh_terms: D006801:Humans; D008678:Metaphysics; D044469:Racial Groups
keywords: Biology of race; Natural kinds; Philosophy of race; Population structure; Race anti-realism; Race realism