Social Transmission of Experience of Agency: An Experimental Study.
The sense of controlling one's own actions is fundamental to normal human mental function, and also underlies concepts of social responsibility for action. However, it remains unclear how the wider social context of human action influences sense of agency. Using a simple experimental design, we investigated, for the first time, how observing the action of another person or a robot could potentially influence one's own sense of agency. We assessed how observing another's action might change the perceived temporal relationship between one's own voluntary actions and their outcomes, which has been proposed as an implicit measure of sense of agency. Working in pairs, participants chose between two action alternatives, one rewarded more frequently than the other, while watching a rotating clock hand. They judged, in separate blocks, either the time of their own action, or the time of a tone that followed the action. These were compared to baseline judgements of actions alone, or tones alone, to calculate the perceptual shift of action toward outcome and vice versa. Our design focused on how these two dependent variables, which jointly provide an implicit measure of sense of agency, might be influenced by observing another's action. In the observational group, each participant could see the other's actions. Multivariate analysis showed that the perceived time of action and tone shifted progressively toward the actual time of outcome with repeated experience of this social situation. No such progressive change occurred in other groups for whom a barrier hid participants' actions from each other. However, a similar effect was observed in the group that viewed movements of a human-like robotic hand, rather than actions of another person. This finding suggests that observing the actions of others increases the salience of the external outcomes of action and this effect is not unique to observing human agents. Social contexts in which we see others controlling external events may play an important role in mentally representing the impact of our own actions on the external world.
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London London, UK.
Nima
N
Khalighinejad
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London London, UK.
Bahador
B
Bahrami
Consciousness, Cognition and Computation Group (CO3), Center for Research in Cognition and Neurosciences, ULB Neuroscience Institute, Université libre de Bruxelles Bruxelles, Belgium.
Emilie A
EA
Caspar
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London London, UK.
Patrick
P
Haggard
action observation; intentional binding; robotic hand; sense of agency; social context