Why cognitive penetration of our perceptual experience is still the most plausible account.
To what extent is our perceptual experience influenced by higher cognitive phenomena like beliefs, desires, concepts, templates? Given recent arguments against the possibility of cognitive penetration, we present striking evidence against the impenetrability claims. The weak impenetrability claim cannot account for (1) extensive structural feedback organization of the brain, (2) temporally very early feedback loops and (3) functional top-down processes modulating early visual processes by category-specific information. The strong impenetrability claim could incorporate these data by widening the "perceptual module" such that it includes rich but still internal processing in a very large perceptual module. We argue that this latter view leads to an implausible version of a module. Therefore, we have to accept cognitive penetration of our perceptual experience as the best theoretical account so far given the available empirical evidence. We outline that this does not have any problematic consequences for the relation between perception and cognition.
Institute for Philosophy II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsstraße 150, 44780 Bochum, Germany. Electronic address: albert.newen@rub.de.
Albert
A
Newen
Department of Psychology & Center for Neural Science, New York University, 6 Washington Place, New York, NY 10003, USA; Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, UK. Electronic address: petra.vetter@rhul.ac.uk.
Petra
P
Vetter
D003071:Cognition / Q000502:physiology*; D006801:Humans; D011582:Psychological Theory; D014796:Visual Perception / Q000502:physiology*
Cognitive penetration; Early visual processes; Impenetrability; Perception–cognition boundary; Perceptual learning; Philosophy of mind; Predictive coding; Top-down modulation; V1; Visual perception