Against compassion: in defence of a "hybrid" concept of empathy.
In this article, I argue that the recent emphasis on compassion in healthcare practice lacks conceptual richness and clarity. In particular, I argue that it would be helpful to focus on a larger concept of empathy rather than compassion alone and that compassion should be thought of as a component of this larger concept of empathy. The first part of the article outlines a critique of the current discourse of compassion on three grounds. This discourse naturalizes, individualizes, and reifies compassion leading to a decontextualized and simplified understanding of failures in healthcare practice. The second part uses resources from phenomenology and contemporary moral philosophy to construct a "hybrid" concept of empathy that includes both pre-reflective/intuitive and cognitive/imaginative components. This "hybrid" concept of empathy leads to a more complex understanding of the multiple responses to others' distress. I conclude that there are no straightforward normative naturalistic responses to others' distress. Rather than conceptualizing compassion as a naturalistic impulse or a character-based trait, we need to consider the complexity of our empathic recognition of vulnerable others.
Senior Lecturer, Division of Nursing, Midwifery and Social Work, School of Health Sciences, Faculty of Biology, Medicine and Health, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK.
Alastair
A
Morgan
D001291:Attitude of Health Personnel; D003695:Delivery of Health Care / Q000941:ethics*; D004645:Empathy / Q000941:ethics*; D006801:Humans
compassion; empathy; expressive understanding; hybrid empathy; phenomenology; vulnerability