Extensional scientific realism vs. intensional scientific realism.
Extensional scientific realism is the view that each believable scientific theory is supported by the unique first-order evidence for it and that if we want to believe that it is true, we should rely on its unique first-order evidence. In contrast, intensional scientific realism is the view that all believable scientific theories have a common feature and that we should rely on it to determine whether a theory is believable or not. Fitzpatrick argues that extensional realism is immune, while intensional realism is not, to the pessimistic induction. I reply that if extensional realism overcomes the pessimistic induction at all, that is because it implicitly relies on the theoretical resource of intensional realism. I also argue that extensional realism, by nature, cannot embed a criterion for distinguishing between believable and unbelievable theories.
Division of General Studies, Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology, Ulju-gun, Ulsan 689-798, Republic of Korea. Electronic address: nature@unist.ac.kr.
Seungbae
S
Park
Extensional realism; Intensional realism; No-miracles argument; Pessimistic induction; Scientific realism