title: Monopolizing Sanctioning Power under Noise Eliminates Perverse Punishment But Does Not Increase Cooperation.
abstract: We run several experiments which allow us to comparecooperationunderperfectandimperfect informationin acentralizedanddecentralized punishmentregime. Under perfect and extremely noisy information, aggregate behavior does not differ between institutions. Under intermediate noise, punishment escalates in the decentralized peer-to-peer punishment regime which badly affects efficiency while sustaining cooperation for longer. Only decentralized punishment is often directed at cooperators (perverse punishment). We report several, sometimes subtle, differences in punishment behavior, and how contributions react.
authors.affiliation: Newcastle University, Newcastle University Business School Newcastle upon Tyne, UK.
authors.forename: Sven
authors.initials: S
authors.lastname: Fischer
authors.affiliation: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Bonn, Germany.
authors.forename: Kristoffel
authors.initials: K
authors.lastname: Grechenig
authors.affiliation: School of Business and Economics, RWTH Aachen University Aachen, Germany.
authors.forename: Nicolas
authors.initials: N
authors.lastname: Meier
keywords: anti-social punishment; centralized punishment; cooperation; imperfect information; perverse punishment; public good