title: Two retailer-supplier supply chain models with default risk under trade credit policy.
abstract: The purpose of the paper is to formulate two uncooperative replenishment models with demand and default risk which are the functions of the trade credit period, i.e., a Nash equilibrium model and a supplier-Stackelberg model. Firstly, we present the optimal results of decentralized decision and centralized decision without trade credit. Secondly, we derive the existence and uniqueness conditions of the optimal solutions under the two games, respectively. Moreover, we present a set of theorems and corollary to determine the optimal solutions. Finally, we provide an example and sensitivity analysis to illustrate the proposed strategy and optimal solutions. Sensitivity analysis reveals that the total profits of supply chain under the two games both are better than the results under the centralized decision only if the optimal trade credit period isn't too short. It also reveals that the size of trade credit period, demand, retailer's profit and supplier's profit have strong relationship with the increasing demand coefficient, wholesale price, default risk coefficient and production cost. The major contribution of the paper is that we comprehensively compare between the results of decentralized decision and centralized decision without trade credit, Nash equilibrium and supplier-Stackelberg models with trade credit, and obtain some interesting managerial insights and practical implications.
authors: School of Economics and Management, Qingdao University of Science & Technology, 99 Songling Rd. Laoshan Dist., Qingdao, 266061 People's Republic of China.
authors: Chengfeng
authors: C
authors: Wu
authors: School of Economics and Management, Beihang University, 37 Xueyuan Rd., Haidian Dist., Beijing, 100191 People's Republic of China.
authors: Qiuhong
authors: Q
authors: Zhao
keywords: Default risk; Nash game; Supplier-Stackelberg game; Supply chain; Trade credit