title: Perceptual Pragmatism and the Naturalized Ontology of Color.
abstract: This paper considers whether there can be any such thing as a naturalized metaphysics of color-any distillation of the commitments of perceptual science with regard to color ontology. I first make some observations about the kinds of philosophical commitments that sometimes bubble to the surface in the psychology and neuroscience of color. Unsurprisingly, because of the range of opinions expressed, an ontology of color cannot simply be read off from scientists' definitions and theoretical statements. I next consider two alternative routes. First, conceptual pluralism inspired by Mark Wilson's analysis of scientific representation. I argue that these findings leave the prospects for a naturalized color ontology rather dim. Second, I outline a naturalized epistemology of perception. I ask how the correctness and informativeness of perceptual states is understood by contemporary perceptual science. I argue that the detectionist ideal of correspondence should be replaced by the pragmatic ideal of usefulness. I argue that this result has significant implications for the metaphysics of color.
authors: Department of History & Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh.
authors: Mazviita
authors: M
authors: Chirimuuta
mesh_terms: D064229:Biological Ontologies; D003118:Color Perception / Q000502:physiology*; D006801:Humans; D019359:Knowledge; D008678:Metaphysics
keywords: Color ontology; Epistemology of perception; Philosophy of cognitive science; Philosophy of color; Philosophy of perception