title: Altruistic punishment does not increase with the severity of norm violations in the field.
abstract: The degree of human cooperation among strangers is a major evolutionary puzzle. A prominent explanation is that cooperation is maintained because many individuals have a predisposition to punish those violating group-beneficial norms. A critical condition for cooperation to evolve in evolutionary models is that punishment increases with the severity of the violation. Here we present evidence from a field experiment with real-life interactions that, unlike in lab experiments, altruistic punishment does not increase with the severity of the violation, regardless of whether it is direct (confronting a violator) or indirect (withholding help). We also document growing concerns for counter-punishment as the severity of the violation increases, indicating that the marginal cost of direct punishment increases with the severity of violations. The evidence suggests that altruistic punishment may not provide appropriate incentives to deter large violations. Our findings thus offer a rationale for the emergence of formal institutions for promoting large-scale cooperation among strangers.
authors: Department of Public Economics, University of Innsbruck, Universitätsstraße 15, A-6020 Innsbruck, Austria.
authors: Loukas
authors: L
authors: Balafoutas
authors: Division of Social Science, New York University Abu Dhabi, P.O. Box 129188 Abu Dhabi, UAE.
authors: Nikos
authors: N
authors: Nikiforakis
authors: Department of Economics, University of Cologne, Universitätsstraße 22a, D-50923 Köln, Germany.
authors: Bettina
authors: 0000-0003-2624-1964
authors: B
authors: Rockenbach
mesh_terms: D000533:Altruism; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D006801:Humans; D007398:Interpersonal Relations; D011678:Punishment; D066262:Social Norms