title: What does recent neuroscience tell us about criminal responsibility?
abstract: A defendant is criminally responsible for his action only if he is shown to have engaged in a guilty act-actus reus(eg for larceny, voluntarily taking someone else's property without permission)-while possessing a guilty mind-mens rea(eg knowing that he had taken someone else's property without permission, intending not to return it)-and lacking affirmative defenses (eg the insanity defense or self-defense). We therefore first review neuroscientific studies that bear on the nature of voluntary action, and so could, potentially, tell us something of importance about theactus reusof crimes. Then we look at studies of intention, perception of risk, and other mental states that matter to themens reaof crimes. And, last, we discuss studies of self-control, which might be relevant to some formulations of the insanity defense. As we show, to date, very little is known about the brain that is of significance for understanding criminal responsibility. But there is no reason to think that neuroscience cannot provide evidence that will challenge our understanding of criminal responsibility.
authors: Adjunct Assistant Professor of Psychology, University of California Los Angeles (UCLA); and Visiting Researcher in Neuroscience, California Institute of Technology (Caltech).
authors: Uri
authors: U
authors: Maoz
authors: Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy & Psychology, Yale Law School.
authors: Gideon
authors: G
authors: Yaffe
keywords: Intention and perception of risk; neuroscience and criminal responsibility; neuroscience and law; self-control; voluntary action