Can bootstrapping explain concept learning?
Susan Carey's account of Quinean bootstrapping has been heavily criticized. While it purports to explain how important new concepts are learned, many commentators complain that it is unclear just what bootstrapping is supposed to be or how it is supposed to work. Others allege that bootstrapping falls prey to the circularity challenge: it cannot explain how new concepts are learned without presupposing that learners already have those very concepts. Drawing on discussions of concept learning from the philosophical literature, this article develops a detailed interpretation of bootstrapping that can answer the circularity challenge. The key to this interpretation is the recognition of computational constraints, both internal and external to the mind, which can endow empty symbols with new conceptual roles and thus new contents.
Department of Philosophy & Centre for Vision Research, York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Electronic address: jbeck@yorku.ca.
Jacob
J
Beck
D003210:Concept Formation; D006801:Humans; D007858:Learning; D008960:Models, Psychological
Bootstrapping; Computational constraints; Concept learning; Concepts; Susan Carey