title: Anisotropic invasion and its consequences in two-strategy evolutionary games on a square lattice.
abstract: We have studied invasion processes in two-strategy evolutionary games on a square lattice for imitation rule when the players interact with their nearest neighbors. Monte Carlo simulations are performed for systems where the pair interactions are composed of a unit strength coordination game when varying the strengths of the self-dependent and cross-dependent components at a fixed noise level. The visualization of strategy distributions has clearly indicated that circular homogeneous domains evolve into squares with an orientation dependent on the composition. This phenomenon is related to the anisotropy of invasion velocities along the interfaces separating the two homogeneous regions. The quantified invasion velocities indicate the existence of a parameter region in which the invasions are opposite for the horizontal (or vertical) and the tilted interfaces. In this parameter region faceted islands of both strategies shrink and the system evolves from a random initial state into the homogeneous state that first percolated.
authors.affiliation: Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary.
authors.forename: György
authors.initials: G
authors.lastname: Szabó
authors.affiliation: Babeş-Bolyai University, Faculty of Physics, RO-400084 Cluj-Napoca, Romania.
authors.forename: Levente
authors.initials: L
authors.lastname: Varga
authors.affiliation: Reed College, Department of Physics, 97202 Portland, Oregon, USA.
authors.forename: Mátyás
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Szabó