title: A Truthful Incentive Mechanism for Online Recruitment in Mobile Crowd Sensing System.
abstract: We investigate emerging mobile crowd sensing (MCS) systems, in which new cloud-based platforms sequentially allocate homogenous sensing jobs to dynamically-arriving users with uncertain service qualities. Given that human beings are selfish in nature, it is crucial yet challenging to design an efficient and truthful incentive mechanism to encourage users to participate. To address the challenge, we propose a novel truthful online auction mechanism that can efficiently learn to make irreversible online decisions on winner selections for new MCS systems without requiring previous knowledge of users. Moreover, we theoretically prove that our incentive possesses truthfulness, individual rationality and computational efficiency. Extensive simulation results under both real and synthetic traces demonstrate that our incentive mechanism can reduce the payment of the platform, increase the utility of the platform and social welfare.
authors.affiliation: Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, No. 6 Kexueyuan South Road, Haidian District, Beijing 100190, China. chenxiao3310@ict.ac.cn.|School of Computer and Control Engineering, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, No. 19 A Yuquan Road, Shijingshan District, Beijing 100049, China. chenxiao3310@ict.ac.cn.
authors.forename: Xiao
authors.initials: X
authors.lastname: Chen
authors.affiliation: Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, No. 6 Kexueyuan South Road, Haidian District, Beijing 100190, China. liumin@ict.ac.cn.
authors.forename: Min
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Liu
authors.affiliation: Source Clear, 20 Ayer Rajah Crescent, Singapore 139964, Singapore. yaqinchou@gmail.com.
authors.forename: Yaqin
authors.initials: Y
authors.lastname: Zhou
authors.affiliation: Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, No. 6 Kexueyuan South Road, Haidian District, Beijing 100190, China. zcli@ict.ac.cn.
authors.forename: Zhongcheng
authors.initials: Z
authors.lastname: Li
authors.affiliation: Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, No. 6 Kexueyuan South Road, Haidian District, Beijing 100190, China. chenshuang@ict.ac.cn.|School of Computer and Control Engineering, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, No. 19 A Yuquan Road, Shijingshan District, Beijing 100049, China. chenshuang@ict.ac.cn.
authors.forename: Shuang
authors.initials: S
authors.lastname: Chen
authors.affiliation: School of Computing, National University of Singapore, Computing 1, Computing Drive, Singapore 117417, Singapore. xiangnan@comp.nus.edu.sg.
authors.forename: Xiangnan
authors.initials: X
authors.lastname: He
keywords: mobile crowd sensing system; online incentive; single-parameter mechanism; truthful mechanism