title: The consequences of understanding expert probability reporting as a decision.
abstract: In this paper we reiterate that the personalist interpretation of probability is inevitable and as least as informed as any other allegedly more 'objective' definition of probability. We also argue that the problem faced by forensic scientists, the reporting on imperfect personal knowledge, in terms of probabilities, can be reconstructed as a decision problem. Tackling this problem through a rigorous decision theoretic analysis provides further argument in support of the view that optimal probability reporting is in terms of single numbers, not intervals.
authors.affiliation: University of Lausanne, School of Criminal Justice, 1015 Lausanne-Dorigny, Switzerland. Electronic address: alex.biedermann@unil.ch.
authors.forename: A
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Biedermann
authors.affiliation: University of Lausanne, School of Criminal Justice, 1015 Lausanne-Dorigny, Switzerland; Ca'Foscari University Venice, Department of Economics, 30121 Venice, Italy.
authors.forename: S
authors.initials: S
authors.lastname: Bozza
authors.affiliation: University of Lausanne, School of Criminal Justice, 1015 Lausanne-Dorigny, Switzerland.
authors.forename: F
authors.initials: F
authors.lastname: Taroni
authors.affiliation: University of Edinburgh, School of Mathematics and Maxwell Institute, Edinburgh, EH9 3FD, Scotland.
authors.forename: C
authors.initials: C
authors.lastname: Aitken
keywords: Decision theory; Probability elicitation; Probability reporting; Scoring rule