title: The Attraction Effect Modulates Reward Prediction Errors and Intertemporal Choices.
abstract: Classical economic theory contends that the utility of a choice option should be independent of other options. This view is challenged by the attraction effect, in which the relative preference between two options is altered by the addition of a third, asymmetrically dominated option. Here, we leveraged the attraction effect in the context of intertemporal choices to test whether both decisions and reward prediction errors (RPE) in the absence of choice violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives principle. We first demonstrate that intertemporal decision making is prone to the attraction effect in humans. In an independent group of participants, we then investigated how this affects the neural and behavioral valuation of outcomes using a novel intertemporal lottery task and fMRI. Participants' behavioral responses (i.e., satisfaction ratings) were modulated systematically by the attraction effect and this modulation was correlated across participants with the respective change of the RPE signal in the nucleus accumbens. Furthermore, we show that, because exponential and hyperbolic discounting models are unable to account for the attraction effect, recently proposed sequential sampling models might be more appropriate to describe intertemporal choices. Our findings demonstrate for the first time that the attraction effect modulates subjective valuation even in the absence of choice. The findings also challenge the prospect of using neuroscientific methods to measure utility in a context-free manner and have important implications for theories of reinforcement learning and delay discounting.
  
  
  
  Many theories of value-based decision making assume that people first assess the attractiveness of each option independently of each other and then pick the option with the highest subjective value. The attraction effect, however, shows that adding a new option to a choice set can change the relative value of the existing options, which is a violation of the independence principle. Using an intertemporal choice framework, we tested whether such violations also occur when the brain encodes the difference between expected and received rewards (i.e., the reward prediction error). Our results suggest that neither intertemporal choice nor valuation without choice adhere to the independence principle.
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychology, University of Basel, 4055 Basel, Switzerland sebastian.gluth@unibas.ch.
authors.forename: Sebastian
authors.identifier: 0000-0003-2241-5103
authors.initials: S
authors.lastname: Gluth
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychology, University of Basel, 4055 Basel, Switzerland.
authors.forename: Jared M
authors.identifier: 0000-0001-7265-1310
authors.initials: JM
authors.lastname: Hotaling
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychology, University of Basel, 4055 Basel, Switzerland.
authors.forename: Jörg
authors.identifier: 0000-0003-2632-8015
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Rieskamp
mesh_terms: D000328:Adult; D001921:Brain / Q000502:physiology*; D002755:Choice Behavior / Q000502:physiology*; D003657:Decision Making / Q000502:physiology*; D005260:Female; D005544:Forecasting; D006801:Humans; D008279:Magnetic Resonance Imaging / Q000379:methods; D008297:Male; D010775:Photic Stimulation / Q000379:methods; D011897:Random Allocation; D012201:Reward; D055815:Young Adult
keywords: asymmetric dominance; cognitive modeling; delay discounting; fMRI; nucleus accumbens; value-based decision making