Harms to "Others" and the Selection Against Disability View.
In recent years, the question of whether prospective parents might have a moral obligation to select against disability in their offspring has piqued the attention of many prominent philosophers and bioethicists, and a large literature has emerged surrounding this question. Rather than looking to the most common arguments given in support of a positive response to the abovementioned question, such as those focusing on the harms disability may impose on the child created, duties and role-specific obligations, and impersonal 'harms', a less commonly made set of arguments is focused upon which looks to the harms that a decision not to select against disability may impose on others. Three different possible arguments supporting a limited duty of disability avoidance are thus identified and subsequently explored: harms to parents themselves, harms to existing family members, and harms to other existing members of society.
Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom.
Nicola Jane
NJ
Williams
D000025:Abortion, Eugenic; D026688:Bioethical Issues; D002755:Choice Behavior; D006233:Persons with Disabilities; D005190:Family; D006801:Humans; D028681:Moral Obligations; D010290:Parents; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D011446:Prospective Studies; D012641:Selection, Genetic; D000068618:Selective Breeding
distributive justice; person-affecting harm; personal autonomy; pre-natal testing; reproductive technology