How vertical integration affects the quantity and cost of care for Medicare beneficiaries.
Health systems are employing physicians in growing numbers. The implications of this trend are poorly understood and controversial. We use rich data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to examine the effects of a set of physician acquisitions by hospital systems on outpatient utilization and spending. We find that financial integration systematically produces economically large changes in the acquired physicians' behavior, but has less consistent effects at the acquiring system level.
Federal Trade Commission, United States. Electronic address: tkoch@ftc.gov.
Thomas G
TG
Koch
Federal Trade Commission, United States. Electronic address: bwendling@ftc.gov.
Brett W
BW
Wendling
Federal Trade Commission, United States. Electronic address: nwilson@ftc.gov.
Nathan E
NE
Wilson
D003695:Delivery of Health Care / Q000191:economics / Q000458:organization & administration / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D019033:Delivery of Health Care, Integrated / Q000191:economics* / Q000458:organization & administration / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D017048:Health Care Costs / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*; D006761:Hospitals / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D006801:Humans; D006278:Medicare / Q000191:economics / Q000458:organization & administration* / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D017059:Models, Econometric; D010820:Physicians / Q000191:economics / Q000458:organization & administration; D010818:Practice Patterns, Physicians' / Q000191:economics / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D014481:United States; D000078329:Workforce
Healthcare; Mergers; Vertical integration