title: The promotion of cooperation by the poor in dynamic chicken games.
abstract: The evolution of cooperative behavior is one of the most important issues in game theory. Previous studies have shown that cooperation can evolve only under highly limited conditions, and various modifications have been introduced to games to explain the evolution of cooperation. Recently, a utility function basic to game theory was shown to be dependent on current wealth as a conditional (state) variable in a dynamic version of utility theory. Here, we introduce this dynamic utility function to several games. Under certain conditions, poor players exhibit cooperative behavior in two types of chicken games (the hawk-dove game and the snowdrift game) but not in the prisoner's dilemma game and the stag hunt game. This result indicates that cooperation can be exhibited by the poor in some chicken games. Thus, the evolution of cooperation may not be as limited as has been suggested in previous studies.
authors.affiliation: Department of International Health, Institute of Tropical Medicine, Nagasaki University, Nagasaki, 852-8523, Japan.|Graduate School of Science and Technology, Shizuoka University, Hamamatsu, 432-8561, Japan.
authors.forename: Hiromu
authors.initials: H
authors.lastname: Ito
authors.affiliation: Department of Mathematical and Systems Engineering, Shizuoka University, Hamamatsu, 432-8561, Japan.
authors.forename: Yuki
authors.initials: Y
authors.lastname: Katsumata
authors.affiliation: Laboratory of Animal Ecology, Department of Ecology and Systematics, Graduate School of Agriculture, Hokkaido University, Sapporo 060-8589, Japan.
authors.forename: Eisuke
authors.initials: E
authors.lastname: Hasegawa
authors.affiliation: Graduate School of Science and Technology, Shizuoka University, Hamamatsu, 432-8561, Japan.|Department of Mathematical and Systems Engineering, Shizuoka University, Hamamatsu, 432-8561, Japan.|Department of Environmental and Forest Biology, State University of New York College of Environmental Science and Forestry, Syracuse, NY 13210, USA.|Marine Biosystems Research Center, Chiba University, Uchiura, Kamogawa, Chiba 299-5502, Japan.
authors.forename: Jin
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Yoshimura
mesh_terms: D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans