[Incentive for Regional Risk Selection in the German Risk Structure Compensation Scheme].
The introduction of the new law GKV-FQWG strengthens the competition between statutory health insurance. If incentives for risk selection exist, they may force a battle for cheap customers. This study aims to document and discuss incentives for regional risk selection in the German risk structure compensation scheme. Identify regional autocorrelation with Moran's l on financial parameters of the risk structure compensation schema. Incentives for regional risk selection do indeed exist. The risk structure compensation schema reduces 91% of the effect and helps to reduce risk selection. Nevertheless, a connection between regional situation and competition could be shown (correlation: 69.5%). Only the integration of regional control variables into the risk compensation eliminates regional autocorrelation. The actual risk structure compensation is leading to regional inequalities and as a consequence to risk selection and distortion in competition.
Quantitative Verfahren, insb. Ökonometrie, Technische Universitat Dresden Volkswirtschaftslehre, Dresden.
Danny
D
Wende
D035881:Compensation and Redress / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D004465:Economic Competition / Q000191:economics / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence / Q000458:organization & administration; D005858:Germany; D006801:Humans; D019458:Insurance Coverage / Q000191:economics / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence* / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D009017:Morbidity; D009313:National Health Programs / Q000191:economics / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence* / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D011057:Politics; D012308:Risk Management / Q000191:economics / Q000458:organization & administration* / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*