title: Representation of affect in sensory cortex.
abstract: Contemporary neuroscience suggests that perception is perhaps best understood as a dynamically iterative process that does not honor cleanly segregated "bottom-up" or "top-down" streams. We argue that there is substantial empirical support for the idea that affective influences infiltrate the earliest reaches of sensory processing and even that primitive internal affective dimensions (e.g., goodness-to-badness) are represented alongside physical dimensions of the external world.
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychology,State University of New York at Binghamton,Binghamton,NY 13902miskovic@binghamton.edukkuntze1@binghamton.edu.
authors.forename: Vladimir
authors.initials: V
authors.lastname: Miskovic
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychology,State University of New York at Binghamton,Binghamton,NY 13902miskovic@binghamton.edukkuntze1@binghamton.edu.
authors.forename: Karl
authors.initials: K
authors.lastname: Kuntzelman
authors.affiliation: Department of Human Development,Human Neuroscience Institute,Cornell University,Ithaca,NY 14853aka47@cornell.edu.
authors.forename: Junichi
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Chikazoe
authors.affiliation: Department of Human Development,Human Neuroscience Institute,Cornell University,Ithaca,NY 14853aka47@cornell.edu.
authors.forename: Adam K
authors.initials: AK
authors.lastname: Anderson
mesh_terms: D000339:Affect; D006801:Humans; D010296:Parietal Lobe / Q000502:physiology*; D010465:Perception