title: Firestone & Scholl conflate two distinct issues.
abstract: Firestone & Scholl (F&S) seem to believe that the viability of a distinction between perception and cognition depends on perception being encapsulated from top-down information. We criticize this assumption and argue that top-down effects can leave the distinction between perception and cognition fully intact. Individuating the visual system is one thing; the question of encapsulation is quite another.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy,University of Maryland,College Park,MD 20742-7615.rogilvie@umd.edupcarruth@umd.eduhttps://sites.google.com/site/ryanogilvie/http://faculty.philosophy.umd.edu/pcarruthers/.
authors.forename: Ryan
authors.initials: R
authors.lastname: Ogilvie
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy,University of Maryland,College Park,MD 20742-7615.rogilvie@umd.edupcarruth@umd.eduhttps://sites.google.com/site/ryanogilvie/http://faculty.philosophy.umd.edu/pcarruthers/.
authors.forename: Peter
authors.initials: P
authors.lastname: Carruthers
mesh_terms: D003071:Cognition; D006801:Humans; D010465:Perception