title: The scope of formal explanation.
abstract: The existence of multiple modes of explanation means that a crucial step in the process of generating explanations has to be selecting a particular mode. The present article identifies the key conceptual, as well as some pragmatic and epistemological, considerations that license the use of the formal mode of explanation, and thus that enter into the process of selecting and generating a formal explanation. Formal explanations explain the presence of certain properties in an instance of a kind by reference to the kind of thing it is (e.g. That has four legs because it is a dog). As such, this mode of explanation is intrinsically tied to kind representations and is applicable domain-generally. Although it is possible for formal explanation to apply domain-generally, for any given kind it is selective in its application, in that it can explain some, but not all, properties of the instances of a kind. It also appears that different types of properties can receive formal explanations across different domains. This article provides a sketch of a theory of the selectivity of formal explanation that results from the manner in which kinds of different types are distinguished. The present discussion also suggests how the mechanisms underlying formal explanations may contribute to the illusion of explanatory depth Keil (Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 368-373,2003), the operation of the inherence heuristic Cimpian & Salomon (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 37, 461-480, 2014a; Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 37, 506-527,2014b), and psychological essentialism (Gelman, 2003).
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychology, Hunter College, CUNY, 695 Park Avenue, New York, NY, 10065, USA. sprasada@hunter.cuny.edu.
authors.forename: Sandeep
authors.initials: S
authors.lastname: Prasada
mesh_terms: D003210:Concept Formation / Q000502:physiology*; D006801:Humans; D011582:Psychological Theory; D013850:Thinking / Q000502:physiology*
keywords: Concepts; Explanation; Kind representation