title: The extended reciprocity: Strong belief outperforms persistence.
abstract: The existence of cooperation is a mysterious phenomenon and demands explanation, and direct reciprocity is one key potential explanation for the evolution of cooperation. Direct reciprocity allows cooperation to evolve for cooperators who switch their behavior on the basis of information about the opponent's behavior. Here, relevant to direct reciprocity is information deficiency. When the opponent's last move is unknown, how should players behave? One possibility is to choose cooperation with some default probability without using any further information. In fact, our previous paper (Kurokawa, 2016a) examined this strategy. However, there might be beneficial information other than the opponent's last move. A subsequent study of ours (Kurokawa, 2017) examined the strategy which uses the own last move when the opponent's last move is unknown, and revealed that referring to the own move and trying to imitate it when information is absent is beneficial. Is there any other beneficial information else? How about strong belief (i.e., have infinite memory and believe that the opponent's behavior is unchanged)? Here, we examine the evolution of strategies with strong belief. Analyzing the repeated prisoner's dilemma game and using evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) analysis against an invasion by unconditional defectors, we find the strategy with strong belief is more likely to evolve than the strategy which does not use information other than the opponent player's last move and more likely to evolve than the strategy which uses not only the opponent player's last move but also the own last move. Strong belief produces the extended reciprocity and facilitates the evolution of cooperation. Additionally, we consider the two strategies game between strategies with strong belief and any strategy, and we consider the four strategies game in which unconditional cooperators, unconditional defectors, pessimistic reciprocators with strong belief, and optimistic reciprocators with strong belief are present.
authors.affiliation: Graduate School of Agriculture, Kyoto University, Oiwake-cho, Kitashirakawa, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8502, Japan; Key Lab of Animal Ecology and Conservation Biology, Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Science, Datun Road, Chaoyang, Beijing 100101, PR China. Electronic address: s52617@hotmail.co.jp.
authors.forename: Shun
authors.initials: S
authors.lastname: Kurokawa
mesh_terms: D000818:Animals; D005075:Biological Evolution; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D003469:Culture; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D007398:Interpersonal Relations; D008960:Models, Psychological; D000068956:Prisoner Dilemma
keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Imperfect information; Iterated prisoner's dilemma; Perception; Reciprocity; Strong belief