title: Abortion for fetal defects: two current arguments.
abstract: A common utilitarian argument in favor of abortion for fetal defects rests on some controversial assumptions about what counts as a life worth living. Yet critics of abortion for fetal defects are also in need of an argument free from controversial assumptions about the future child's quality of life. Christopher Kaczor (in: Kaczor (ed), The ethics of abortion: women's rights, human life, and the question of justice, Routledge, New York, 2011) has devised an analogy that apparently satisfies this condition. On close scrutiny, however, Kaczor's analogy is too weak to debunk the common-morality intuition that at least some abortions for fetal defects are morally permissible. The upshot of this discussion is that, on the moral permissibility of abortions for fetal defects, a case-by-case approach is to be preferred.
authors.affiliation: St. Cloud State University, Saint Cloud, MN, USA. snuccetelli@stcloudstate.edu.
authors.forename: Susana
authors.identifier: http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0404-058X
authors.initials: S
authors.lastname: Nuccetelli
mesh_terms: D000028:Abortion, Induced / Q000941:ethics*; D000013:Congenital Abnormalities / Q000601:surgery*; D026689:Ethical Analysis; D005260:Female; D030342:Genetic Diseases, Inborn / Q000601:surgery*; D006801:Humans; D009014:Morals; D010686:Philosophy, Medical; D011247:Pregnancy; D037841:Pregnant People / Q000523:psychology; D011788:Quality of Life; D014933:Women's Rights / Q000941:ethics
keywords: Abortion for Down syndrome; Compromised infants; Fetal defects; Hard cases of abortion; Procreative freedom